What should the Fed do?

What should the Fed do?

NGDP level targeting

But what should the Fed do right now?

NGDP level targeting

OK, but they won’t. So what should the Fed do to interest rates right now?

Set the target rate consistent with 4% NGDP growth

But what is the target rate consistent with 4% NGDP growth?

How should I know? They are the geniuses that think interest rate targeting is a sensible policy tool. Not me. Let them figure out how to use this supposedly effective policy tool.

Consider the following two possible scenarios:

1. The Fed sets the perfect fed funds target, like an Olympic gymnast nailing a landing. But it does poorly on forward guidance.

2. The Fed botches its interest rate setting, but issues sensible forward guidance.

I’d take the second scenario in a heartbeat.

PS. Two things to keep in mind:

1. The market is never wrong.

2. The market is always wrong.

If you can grok the sense in which both of these are true, you will be able to achieve a deeper perspective when thinking about the economy. I.e., the market is always the optimal forecast, but things never turn out exactly as forecast.

PPS. Here are two more:

1. What matters is changes in asset prices.

2. What matters is levels of asset prices.

The change matters for how we should change our view of the situation. Levels matter for how we should form our view of the situation.

PPPS. Part of today’s selloff may be an investor reaction to the BOJ moving back to its pre-2013 deflationary monetary policy, for reasons I’ll never understand.



The Second Sex

I don’t follow Democratic politics closely, but those who do suggest that Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer would have been a strong possibility to be the nominee if there were an open primary. She’s a popular governor in a part of the country that will determine the election.

[Conditional forecast: If Harris wins Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania, she wins the election. If Trump wins even one of those 3 states (as I expect), Trump wins the election.]

But after Harris was picked. Whitmer completely dropped off the list as a possible VP candidate. Why is that?

I was recently chatting with someone about Harris’s upcoming VP pick. In my conversation, I specifically suggested “the Michigan Governor” would be the obvious choice, without mentioning her gender. When I said this ideal candidate wasn’t being considered, the person responded “What’s wrong with him?” I said, “That’s exactly the problem, the presumption that the pick will be a him.”

Here’s Wikipedia:

The Second Sex (French: Le Deuxième Sexe) is a 1949 book by the French existentialist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, in which the author discusses the treatment of women in the present society as well as throughout all of history. Beauvoir researched and wrote the book in about 14 months between 1946 and 1949. . . .

Beauvoir asks, “What is woman?” She argues that man is considered the default, while woman is considered the “Other”: “Thus, humanity is male, and man defines woman not herself, but as relative to him.”

A lot has changed since 1949. Today, affirmative action programs favor women and minorities for certain positions. Harris herself was chosen by Biden partly because she was a woman. At the same time, I suspect that Beauvoir was on to something. A man is viewed as a human being, whereas a woman is viewed as a non-male human being. I don’t recall people being surprised that Trump picked another male to serve as his VP. People objected to Vance, but not because a presidential ticket was unbalanced if both candidates were male. There’s little doubt that Harris is not considering Whitmer precisely because she fears the electorate would view a ticket with two women as being “weird”. But why?

PS. Lots of people think in moralistic terms, and as a result their their thinking on issues of race and gender lacks nuance. For example, it can be true that blacks are favored over whites for some jobs, and also be true that whites are favored over blacks for some jobs.

It can even be true that some blacks are discriminated against because of the way that civil rights laws have been interpreted by the courts, which has led some employers to fear that they’d be unable to fire a poorly performing black employee. So they refrain from hiring people with black sounding names. You rarely hear of this problem, because it doesn’t fit well with either left or right wing moralizing. Among both the left and the right, our intuition about what’s fair doesn’t always conform to the way that the world actually works.

PPS. Studies of bias for or against female candidates have been in the news. These studies have zero bearing on the question of bias toward female candidates running for president.

PPPS. As Trump has demonstrated, a man can be nasty and rude and still be an effective candidate. A woman must come across as more appealing. Whitmer looks like the sort of woman that men would vote for:

Reasoning from an interest rate change

I just saw Richard Clarida on CNBC, saying something to the effect that “The bond market is doing the Fed’s job for it”.

No, no, a thousand times no!!! Interest rates are not monetary policy. Interest rates plunged in 2008, but the bond market wasn’t doing the Fed’s job for it. Interest rates plunged in 1929-32. Interest rates are not monetary policy.

Cameron Blank direct me to this Jason Furman tweet:

To be clear, I do not have any problem with Furman’s general view on the current stance of monetary policy, or on the Fed’s decision yesterday. We have similar views. But the sharp fall in long-term rates does not make money easier, it probably makes it tighter.

Here are some things to consider:

Lower fed funds rates achieved through open market purchases are expansionary. M increases.

Lower IOR for any given monetary base is expansionary. V increases.

Lower bond yields for any given IOR and monetary base level is probably contractionary (depending on forward guidance.) Base velocity decreases.

Think of it this way. If you lower the yield on bonds, you probably reduce velocity. If the money supply is unchanged, NGDP tends to fall.

To a very great extent, monetary policy is (hopefully) skillfully adjusting the fed funds target in response to changes in the (unobservable) natural interest rate. A sharp fall in bond yields on a day when the fed funds rate is not adjusted is often a sign that the natural interest rate has fallen, making money effectively tighter. A sign that you are “behind the curve”.

Lower interest rates are not “good for the economy”; that’s reasoning from a price change. It depends on why interest rates are changing.

If I’m wrong, then what would you expect if bond yields fall another 50 basis points tomorrow? Would that be bullish news?

Second derivative blues

Payroll employment rises by 114,000 and unemployment is only 4.3%. Wages are up 3.6% over the past 12 months. Those are really good numbers!

Unfortunately, it’s often the second derivative that tells the real story. There are strong signs that the economy is slowing rapidly. That doesn’t necessarily mean there’ll be a recession, but I’d say there’s at least a 95% chance that one of the following two events will occur late this year:

1. A recession

2. America’s first ever mini-recession, defined as a rise in unemployment of between 1% and 2%, before resuming its decline

When inflation got out of control in 2021-22, I suggested that we ought to be rooting for a mini-recession. Some people thought I was being too pessimistic. Now a mini-recession is the optimistic case.

To be clear, I do not regard a mini-recession as an actual recession. But disinflation never seems to be completely painless.

The Atlanta Fed estimates Q3 RGDP growth at 2.5%. I suspect that this estimate does not incorporate the latest jobs report, so that will be something to watch.

Over at Econlog, I discuss our inefficient monetary policy regime. Because Powell is basically a dove, I’d expect at least a 50 basis point cut in September. The problem here is that interest rate targeting simply doesn’t work very well—they should be targeting NGDP growth expectations. TIPS spreads are swinging wildly while the fed funds rate stays at 5.25%. Instead, interest rates should be swinging wildly as the TIPS spread remains stable. This is no way to run a modern economy.

Normally, the Fed’s FAIT policy would help at a time like this. Unfortunately, the Fed has lost a great deal of credibility on inflation, so I would not expect them to rely on another promise of “make-up inflation”.

Now do you see why I’m such a stickler for sticking to rigorous rules, even if there’s a bit of pain in the short run? It’s way easier to stabilize the economy if you have a credible, forward-looking, level targeting regime.

We do not have one.

PS. Sahm’s Rule has been triggered. So has my 2011 claim that we always have a recession when unemployment rises more than 0.8% above its cyclical low. I don’t believe there are any foolproof forecasting techniques, and I believe that a mere mini-recession is still very possible. It will be a quite interesting 6 months. “Make TheMoneyIllusion Great Again!” Wouldn’t it be wonderful if I never mentioned Trump for 6 months? No, that would mean we have an economic disaster on our hands.

Provoked by a provocative piece

It seems to me that the term ‘provoked’ has a sort of negative connotation. Don’t poke the bear, you’ll only provoke him. On the other hand, ‘provocative’ can have a positive connotation. He expressed some provocative ideas, meaning interesting ideas. But doesn’t provocative mean things that provoke?

Tyler Cowen has a new piece in Bloomberg entitled:

Trump Likes the Idea of a Federal Bitcoin Reserve. Don’t Laugh.

The idea of a government fund invested in cryptocurrency may sound foolish, but there are reasons for the US Treasury to consider adding Bitcoin to its portfolio.

The article provoked (annoyed) me with some provocative (interesting) ideas.

I suspect that Tyler Cowen knows that his essay was provocative. Consider phrases such as “don’t laugh” and “may sound foolish.” Tyler went into this arena with eyes wide open, asking for trouble.

I want to be clear that when I suggest this is a loony idea, I do not mean it in the subjective sense that I disagree with the proposal. I mean it in the objective sense that it would be widely regarded as loony by almost all economists. But it’s equally true that my claim that the Fed caused the Great Recession with a tight money policy is viewed as loony by almost all economists (probably including Tyler). Being viewed as loony doesn’t make it wrong.

If Tyler did an article headlined “Actually, MMT makes a lot of sense”, it would be easy to quickly refute the claim without working up a sweat. It’s easy to show that MMT doesn’t make a lot of sense. But here Tyler is not presenting Trump’s views on Bitcoin reserves, he’s taken on the challenge of making his own plausible case for a Bitcoin reserve. In the end he’s wrong, but refuting his claims does require one to work up quite a sweat.

I apologize to readers for the length of this post, which is akin to killing a mosquito with a sledgehammer. But I have an ulterior motive. At the end, I’ll hijack the post and begin to consider other issues, such as methodology. How did Tyler end up with this view? How did I end up with my foolish view? Why is my foolish view on the Great Recession superior to Tyler’s foolish view on Bitcoin? These are much more subtle questions than the issue of whether Trump is spouting foolishness (hint–he is.)

The early parts of the essay are not very important. Tyler correctly points out that the Fed has holdings of gold. He points out that the Fed has purchased Treasury securities and high quality commercial paper. But the gold was purchased at a time when the US was still on a gold standard. We are not on a Bitcoin standard. The purchase of high quality commercial paper was not motivated by a desire to build up a commercial paper reserve, it was a part of QE. More broadly, the Fed wisely refrains from buying highly speculative assets such as Bitcoin, indeed they don’t even purchase common stock.

Separately, the US government maintains reserves of some critical commodities, such as its Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 

Yes, but Bitcoin is not a critical commodity.

Jersey City’s pension fund has plans to invest in Bitcoin, as the state of Wisconsin already is.

But the federal government has no money to invest. They’re broke. Even if you believe in fairy tales like the “Social Security trust fund”, how would voters feel about putting billions of dollars of that “fund” into crypto, and then seeing the price fall 80%?

El Salvador is another case in point. The country already is fully dollarized, and President Nayib Bukele has been taking steps to encourage crypto use and investment. So far his intended crypto revolution has not taken off, but the country does offer highly favorable terms for crypto users and investors.

But hasn’t this experiment gone poorly?

I see all of these claims as mere debating points. Tyler is anticipating complaints that Bitcoin is not something the government should be involved in, and trying to suggest that the idea is not so far fetched. But none of this makes a positive case for a Bitcoin reserve, that comes at the end of the essay.

There is only one claim that I strongly take issue with:

In short, there might be a number of governments that use dollars and crypto as a significant part of their natural monetary base

Sorry to beat a dead horse, but I cannot resist. In economics, the term “natural” has a very specific meaning. There is a natural rate of interest, a natural rate of unemployment, and a natural rate of output. But it would be nonsense to speak of a natural rate of inflation, a natural rate of NGDP growth, or, I’m afraid to say, a natural monetary base.

Even worse, Bitcoin is not part of the monetary base, because it’s not even money in the sense that base money is money. It’s not a medium of account. Rather than money, think of Bitcoin as a sort of fiat commodity, which serves as a store of value, occasionally a medium of exchange, but almost never a unit of account. Sort of like electronic gold. But gold used to be a medium of account, whereas Bitcoin was never a medium of account. So more like electronic platinum.

Finally we get to the meat of the argument—the actual case for the creation of a US Bitcoin reserve. To me, it reads like the sort of argument a very smart person would make if forced to defend a seemingly indefensible proposition. It’s the macroeconomics equivalent of a quadruple bank shot in billiards. Here’s how I’d summarize his argument:

Perhaps the dollar and Bitcoin are complements. Perhaps countries will increasingly dollarize in the future. Perhaps dollarizing countries will wish to hold Bitcoin in order to evade potential US economic sanctions. Perhaps they’d be more willing to hold Bitcoin if Bitcoin were highly respected. Perhaps Bitcoin would be more highly respected if the US government bought lots of Bitcoin. Perhaps countries would be more likely to dollarize if Bitcoin were more respected. Perhaps if more countries dollarized there would be more demand for dollars. Perhaps this proposal could allow the US could maintain a higher level of consumption (via greater seignorage.) Perhaps it would be a good idea to boost our consumption in this fashion, were it possible.

Wait, that’s not a quadruple bank shot; I count no less than nine uses of “perhaps”. Unfortunately, a number of these claims are unlikely to be true. But now you see why I said we’d have to work up a sweat to refute this proposal.

At first glance, the dollar and Bitcoin seem like substitutes, not complements. Tyler presents a possible rationale why they might be complements in a very specific case, but it still seems likely that they are net substitutes at a global level. In the past 100 years, the progress toward dollarization has been very slow (a few small places like Ecuador, El Salvador.) I’d expect private Bitcoin demand to remain vastly more important that government Bitcoin demand in dollarizing countries over the next 100 years. So I’d say the first “perhaps” is unlikely.

Yes, I do think it at least somewhat plausible that dollarization will increase in the future. So I’ll rate the second “perhaps” as uncertain. Ditto for the third claim, that dollarizing countries will wish to hold more Bitcoin reserves than non-dollarizing countries—plausible but uncertain.

I am skeptical that the decision to hold Bitcoin reserves will be strongly linked to its respectability. Bitcoin is currently used partly because of its anonymity, sometimes for nefarious purposes. If a country were to build a Bitcoin reserve to evade possible US sanctions, why would it care if the US government viewed the asset as respectable?

I’m also skeptical that US purchases would move the needle very much on respectability, but here Tyler’s claim is at least plausible.

I very much doubt whether countries would be more likely to dollarize if Bitcoin were respected, for the same reason that I indicated above when I suggested that respectability would not play a major role in their use of the asset as a way to evade sanctions. This seems like an extremely difficult bank shot—I just don’t see it.

Most economists would agree with Tyler’s claim that more countries dollarizing would increase the total demand for dollars. But is that true? In a normal country, currency demand is usually only around 5% to 10% of GDP. That’s because other assets like T-bills are also safe, and offer a higher rate of return. So here’s my question: What is the current demand for dollars in a high inflation country like Argentina? It seems possible that dollars are actually more in demand today (when the alternative is the high inflation pesos) than they would be were Argentina to dollarize, and inflation fell to low single digits. Thus even one of Tyler’s least controversial “perhaps” is perhaps a bit uncertain.

Even if massive Bitcoin purchases did lead to a bit more dollarization, and even if this did increase the demand for US currency, it’s not clear that this would enable higher US consumption. After all, Bitcoin is very costly to produce, if only in terms of energy consumption. All the energy poured into producing Bitcoin is no longer available to produce other consumer goods. There’s an opportunity cost of more Bitcoin. Note, this doesn’t mean I’m anti-Bitcoin, just that an argument for a US reserves needs to consider both costs and benefits. Private sector actors do this when using Bitcoin, but a government reserve would be paid for with our tax dollars. Is this a wise use of funds?

And finally, even in the exceedingly unlikely event that the first 8 banks in the billiard shot went perfectly, I’d still view increased US consumption funded by seignorage as a net negative. Dollarizing countries tend to be economic basket cases. What’s the point in trying to squeeze a bit more money out of those poor countries so that we can be a bit richer? Bill Gates takes money from middle class Windows buyers and helps the world’s poor. Is our goal to do a reverse Gates, and take money from the world’s poor so that we can be a tiny bit richer? Aren’t we better than that?

To be clear, I’m not saying that dollarization is a bad thing, just that I don’t view the specific seignorage-> US consumption argument as an appealing one.

Maybe you have a really smart friend that believes the CIA was behind the Kennedy assassination. You know his theory is nuts, but it’s hard to refute. He’s studied the issue much more than you have, and has lots of talking points. How did your really smart friend end up with this theory? Perhaps it was motivated reasoning. Perhaps he was looking for arguments that buttressed his theory, and not spending much time looking for arguments refuting his theory. But you really need to do both!! I suspect that if someone put a gun to his head, Tyler could have come up with lots of arguments against his proposal, along the lines of what I’ve suggested here. (In fairness, he mentions one or two.) Perhaps he was intrigued by the challenge of finding a rationale for a claim that he knew most economists would view (his words) as “foolish”. I know that I am occasionally intrigued by the idea of establishing an interesting contrarian theory.

Which brings me to the Great Recession, the real purpose of my post.

1. Perhaps a sharp fall in NGDP growth will cause a big recession.

2. Perhaps monetary policy can prevent big falls in NGDP, especially when interest rates are positive.

3. Perhaps interest rates were positive until mid-December 2008, a year after the Great Recession began.

4. Perhaps monetary policy should be set at a position where expected NGDP growth is about 4% or 5%.

5. Perhaps market forecasts of NGDP growth are our best forecasts.

6. Perhaps markets were very clearly signaling deficient NGDP growth ahead during the second half of 2008.

7. Perhaps the Fed ignored those market signals.

8. Perhaps a more expansionary monetary policy in 2008 would have prevented a deep drop in NGDP.

9. Perhaps if a more expansionary policy were not enough, the Fed could also have committed to level targeting, to eventually returning NGDP to the previous trend line. Maybe that would have prevented a Great Recession.

Another 9-bank billiard shot? Perhaps, but in this case I believe there is very strong evidence that all nine claims are true.

To conclude:

My objectively foolish theory >>>>>> Tyler’s objectively foolish theory.

(Again, by “objectively foolish” I mean regarded as such by almost all economists. In contrast, the philosophical use of “objective truth” is utter nonsense.)

PS. Josh Hendrickson has an excellent post on this topic.