Category: Economics
Update on the Supervillains (maybe that’s you)
The law’s price controls will also deter companies from developing new medicines. A study I co-authored estimated that 135 fewer drugs will come to market through 2039 because of the Inflation Reduction Act. Research firm Vital Transformation’s forecast is even bleaker, predicting that the U.S. could lose 139 drugs within the next decade.
Dozens of life-sciences companies have announced cuts to their research and development pipelines because of the 2022 law. These announcements have come in earnings calls and filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission—where deliberate misstatements would expose executives to civil and criminal penalties—so they can’t be chalked up to political posturing.
That is from Tomas Philipson at the WSJ. It is worth noting this kind of academic research has not been effectively rebutted, rather what you usually hear in response is a bunch of snarky comments about Big Pharma and the like.
And to repeat myself yet again: if you are ever tempted to cancel somebody, ask yourself “do I cancel those who favor tougher price controls on pharma? After all, they may be inducing millions of premature deaths.” If you don’t cancel those people — and you shouldn’t — that should broaden your circle of tolerance more generally.
Bryan Caplan on YIMBY in the NYT
Here is one excerpt:
What few appreciate is that the overregulation of housing has blocked a classic American path: moving to a higher-wage part of the country to secure a better life. A paper by the economists Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag shows that housing costs now routinely outweigh wage gains: While janitors and waiters do indeed earn higher salaries in the Bay Area, they have to spend much more than their extra pay on rent. Programmers and lawyers who move to gold-rush regions still come out ahead, but the rest of the workforce is gradually getting out of Dodge. In a functional society, self-interest inspires workers to relocate to wherever they are most productive. In our society, strict housing regulation has decoupled movement and value, leading to the mass migration of lower-income residents away from geographic centers of technological progress and economic growth.
Here is the entire article, and don’t forget about Bryan’s new book on housing deregulation Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation.
My excellent Conversation with Brian Winter
Here is the video, audio, and transcript. Here is the episode summary:
It’s not just the churrasco that made him fall in love with Brazil. Brian Winter has been studying and writing about Latin America for over 20 years. He’s been tracking the struggles and triumphs of the region as it’s dealt with decades of coups, violence, and shifting economics. His work offers a nuanced perspective on Latin America’s persistent challenges and remarkable resilience.
Together Brian and Tyler discuss the politics and economics of nearly every country from the equator down. They cover the future of migration into Brazil, what it’s doing right in agriculture, the cultural shift in race politics, crime in Rio and São Paulo, the effectiveness and future consequences of Bukele’s police state in El Salvador, the economic growth of Colombia despite continued violence, the prevalence of startups and psychoanalysis in Argentina, Uruguay’s reduction in poverty levels, the beautiful ugliness of Sao Paulo, where Brian will explore next, and more.
And here is one excerpt;
COWEN: What’s the economic geography of Brazil going to look like? All the wealth near Mato Grosso and the north just very, very poor? Or the north empties out? How’s that going to work? There used to be some modest degree of balance.
WINTER: That’s true. Most of the population in Brazil and the economic center, for sure, was in the southeast. That means, really, São Paulo state, which is about a quarter of Brazil’s population but roughly a third of its GDP. Rio as well, and the state of Minas Gerais, which has a name that tells its history. That means “general mines” in Portuguese. That’s the area where a lot of the gold came out of in the 18th and 19th centuries. That’s gone now, so it’s not as much of an economic pull.
You’re right, Tyler, though, that a lot of the real boom right now, the action, is in places like Mato Grosso, which is in the region of Brazil called the Central West. That’s soy country. I’m from Texas, and Mato Grosso is virtually indistinguishable from Texas these days. It’s hot. It’s flat. The crop, like I said, is soy. There’s cattle ranching as well.
Even the music — Brazil, as others have noted, has gone from being the country of bossa nova and the samba in the 1970s to being the country of sertanejo today. Sertanejo is a Brazilian cousin of country music with accordions, but it’s sung by people — men mostly — in jeans, big belt buckles, and cowboy hats. They’re importing that — not only that economic model but that lifestyle as well.
COWEN: What is the great Brazilian music of today? MPB is dead, right? So, what should someone listen to?
Recommended, interesting throughout.
Rent Control
Kholodilin offers a comprehensive review of the literature on rent control, some 206 papers, published and unpublished from 1967-2013. The results are summarized in the figure below where (-) indicates papers finding a negative effect, (0) no effect and (+) a positive effect. The top left figure, for example, shows, not surprisingly, that almost all papers find that rent controls does lower rents in the rent-controlled units.
Most papers that study the issue, however, find that rents increase in the uncontrolled units (middle row, right column.) In other words, “the imposition of rent control amplifies the shortage of housing. Therefore, the waiting queues become longer and would-be tenants must spend more time looking for a dwelling.”
Similarly, “nearly all studies indicate a negative effect of rent control on mobility” (top column, middle row).
Importantly, “the published studies are almost unanimous with respect to the impact of rent control on the quality of housing….[namely] that rent control leads to a deterioration in the quality of those dwellings subject to regulations.” (middle row, middle column).
30th anniversary of the Brazilian real
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one excerpt, starting with the reality of Brazilian hyperinflation in the early 1990s:
Fortunately, economists and other reformers came to the rescue and designed an effective plan for currency stabilization. Brazil first created a virtual currency, called the URV, and switched contracts and prices to the new accounting unit. Next, a new currency, the real, was introduced as equal in value to the URV and roughly equal to the US dollar. That created the prospect of a new and more stable currency.
The crucial part of the reforms was a credible plan for fiscal stability. Brazil wasn’t experiencing hyperinflation for no reason — rather, the freshly printed money was needed to make good on promised government expenditures. So to make the numbers add up without hyperinflation, the Brazilian government carried out some budget cuts, privatized some assets, transferred some functions to state and local governments, and made some constitutional and legislative pledges in the direction of a balanced budget…
Yet the ending to this story is by no means entirely happy. For several years Brazil’s economy has been growing below 1%, though it has recently climbed above 2%. The country has bountiful natural resources, plenty of human talent, some excellent companies and universities, and no natural geopolitical enemies. Still, its economic growth has been mediocre. Brazil ought to be able to achieve annual growth of 4% to 6%.
The causes of this disappointing growth are varied and subject to dispute. Possible culprits include corruption, excess protectionism, an economy too dependent on natural resources, an unreliable education system and, perhaps, a loss of economic dynamism. In the golden years of the late 1960s and early ‘70s, Brazil had very high growth rates, hitting 14% in 1973, so extremely good performance is possible.
Worth a ponder.
U.S: elevators are much more expensive
Behind the dearth of elevators in the country that birthed the skyscraper are eye-watering costs. A basic four-stop elevator costs about $158,000 in New York City, compared with about $36,000 in Switzerland. A six-stop model will set you back more than three times as much in Pennsylvania as in Belgium. Maintenance, repairs, and inspections all cost more in America too.
The first thing to notice about our elevators is that, like many things in America, they are huge. New elevators outside the U.S. are typically sized to accommodate a person in a large wheelchair plus somebody standing behind them. American elevators have ballooned to about twice that size, driven by a drip-drip-drip of regulations, each motivated by a slightly different concern — first accessibility, then accommodation for ambulance stretchers, then even bigger stretchers.
Large Firms in the South Korean Growth Miracle
We quantify the contribution of the largest firms to South Korea’s economic performance over the period 1972-2011. Using firm-level historical data, we document a novel fact: firm concentration rose substantially during the growth miracle period. To understand whether rising concentration contributed positively or negatively to South Korean real income, we build a quantitative heterogeneous firm small open economy model. Our framework accommodates a variety of potential causes and consequences of changing firm concentration: productivity, distortions, selection into exporting, scale economies, and oligopolistic and oligopsonistic market power in domestic goods and labor markets. The model is implemented directly on the firm-level data and inverted to recover the drivers of concentration. We find that most of the differential performance of the top firms is attributable to higher productivity growth rather than differential distortions. Exceptional performance of the top 3 firms within each sector relative to the average firms contributed 15% to the 2011 real GDP and 4% to the net present value of welfare over the period 1972-2011. Thus, the largest Korean firms were superstars rather than supervillains.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Jaedo Choi, Andrei A. Levchenko, Dimitrije Ruzic, and Younghun Shim.
Agricultural Productivity in Africa
If you look at total output, Peter Coy notes that sub-Saharan Africa looks quite impressive with gains in total output exceeding that in the rest of the world.
But almost all of this has come from using more inputs, especially land. If you look at output per unit of input, i.e. total factor productivity (TFP) then sub-Saharan Africa not only trails the rest of the world, it’s falling behind.
Things get much worse if you look at agricultural productivity by country. Alice Evans points us to “the most important graph” from work by Suri et al. (2024) which shows shockingly that since ~2010 agricultural productivity has plummeted in many African nations. I found this graph hard to believe.
The numbers are correct based on data from the USDA but digging deeper, I noted that the two worst performing countries are Djibouti and Botswana–two small countries where agriculture is less than 5% of GDP and where climate and land mean that agriculture has no hope of ever being a great success. Moreover, Djibouti is growing rapidly and Botswana is a middle-income country with a booming economy. I suspect that what is going on here is that a growing economy is pulling the best (unmeasured) people and resources out of agriculture which leads what was already a small sector to become less productive on paper, albeit at no great loss to the economy.
In contrast, the countries where Ag TFP is rising the most are Zimbabwe and Senegal where agriculture is a much larger share of GDP and employment (Zimbabwe ~11-14% of GDP, 70% of employment and Senegal 16% of GDP, 30% of employment). So the good news is that agricultural productivity is growing in places where it is important.
Bottom line is that agricultural productivity in Africa is low. I see the primary cause as being small firms which means there are few opportunities for economies of scale, mechanization and R&D (see Suri et al. (2024) for a longer discussion.). Climate change is a threat and developing climate-resistant crops, especially for Africa where heat stress will become increasingly important, has high potential returns.
Overall, however, my conclusion is that although agricultural productivity in Africa is low and there are threats on the horizon the situation is getting modestly better rather than dramatically worse.
Incentives matter, for childbirth too
That is the topic of my latest Bloomberg column, here is one bit:
There is in fact a pronounced “baby bump” in December. The numbers show that induced deliveries and scheduled Caesarian section deliveries are higher than average toward the very end of the year.
Why? In the US, there are significant tax advantages to having a child. If you are a single parent with an adjusted gross income below $112,500, an extra child brings you a $3,600 child tax credit per year.
So — speaking strictly about the tax implications, of course — a New Year’s Eve baby is better than New Year’s baby: You can claim that little bundle of joy as a dependent for the entire year, even though they were only there for a day of it. Yet further benefits could come from state-level earned income tax credit and child tax credit programs.
You might argue that the parents, not the kids, gain the most from these tax benefits. You might also ask if there are some costs to these newly born children. In fact, the study shows that these children have lower birthweights. Further research shows that the accelerated births had noticeable impacts on the children, again finding lower birthweights.
The good news, however, is that those same kids have accelerated weight gains over the course of subsequent examinations. The further good news is that those children reach early development milestones at a faster pace than average. That may reflect the extra income the parents have, since higher income and other positive parental features do predict better developmental outcomes for the kids.
Don’t wait until April!
Time Preference, Parenthood and Policy Preferences
Using a small sample of couples before and after they have children, Alex Gazmararian finds that support for climate change policy increases after people have children. People also become more future-orientated when primed to think of children.
The short time horizons of citizens is a prominent explanation for why governments fail to tackle significant long-term public policy problems. Actual evidence of the influence of time horizons is mixed, complicated by the difficulty of determining how individuals’ attitudes would differ if they were more concerned about the future. I approach this challenge by leveraging a personal experience that leads people to place more value on the future: parenthood. Using a matched difference-in-differences design with panel data, I compare new parents with otherwise similar individuals and find that parenthood increases support for addressing climate change by 4.3 percentage points. Falsification tests and two survey experiments suggest that longer time horizons explain part of this shift in support. Not only are scholars right to emphasize the role of individual time horizons, but changing valuations of the future offer a new way to understand how policy preferences evolve.
It’s a little tricky to say that the driving force is time preference per se, maybe it’s just caring about (some) future people. Suppose a white man marries an African American woman. He subsequently may become more interested in civil rights, just as having children may make people more interested in the(ir) future. Or suppose that medical technology extends life expectancy, leading people to save more. Is this due to lower time preference or increased-self love?
We do see more parenthood driving future-oriented behavior on many margins. I am reminded, for example, of More Pregnancy, Less Crime which showed huge drops in criminal activity as people learn that they will be mothers and fathers. Criminals are very present-oriented so this effect is also consistent with parenthood driving lower time preference, although other stories are also possible. It’s difficult to distinguish these explanations and as far as policy and behavior is concerned perhaps the distinction between caring about the future and caring about future people doesn’t really matter.
*Emergency Money*
The author is Tom Wilkinson, and the subtitle is Notgeld in the Image Economy of the German Inflation, 1914-1923. Notgeld, or emergency money, typically was privately issued to make up for the deficiencies of government money during that period.
It is hard to think of a book that is more “for me.” The book covers history, monetary economics, private currency issuance, and the artistic renderings put on the private notes. You can see plenty of desperation in those visuals, and clearly the 19th century seems like a long time ago. I read this one right away upon arrival.
You can buy it here. Here is a good short piece on the art.
What should I ask Nate Silver?
Yes, I will be doing another Conversation with Nate, based in part on his new and forthcoming book On the Edge: The Art of Risking Everything (I have just started it, but so far it is very good, dealing with issues of poker and also risk-taking more generally).
Here is my previous Conversation with Nate Silver. And please note I am not looking to ask him about the election. So what should I ask?
Deep roots, the persistent legacy of slavery on free labor markets
To engage with the large literature on the economic effects of slavery, we use antebellum census data to test for statistical differences at the 1860 free-slave border. We find evidence of lower population density, less intensive land use, and lower farm values on the slave side. Half of the border region was half underutilized. This does not support the view that abolition was a costly constraint for landowners. Indeed, the lower demand for similar, yet cheaper, land presents a different puzzle: why wouldn’t the yeomen farmers cross the border to fill up empty land in slave states, as was happening in the free states of the Old Northwest? On this point, we find evidence of higher wages on the slave side, indicating an aversion of free labor to working in a slave society. This evidence of systemically lower economic performance in slavery-legal areas suggests that the earlier literature on the profitability of plantations was misplaced, or at least incomplete.
That is from a new NBER working paper by Hoyt Bleakley and Paul Rhode.
How the German welfare state punishes performance
The German welfare state is generous but this leads to implicit tax rates for those on welfare that can exceed 100%. Here’s a useful summary from the German newspaper Handelsblatt. (The original is in German, this is a Google translation.)
Poorly coordinated state benefits such as the citizen’s allowance, housing benefit or child allowance often mean that additional work is not worthwhile or, in extreme cases, even leads to lower net income. The Ifo Institute has calculated this for various household types for the Handelsblatt newspaper – and shown how anti-performance the system sometimes is.
..A dual-income couple with two children aged five and nine, who work full-time and each earn 2000 euros gross per month, have a net income of 2686 euros with rent and heating costs of 1235 euros.
The couple therefore only has 887 euros more at their disposal per month than the household receiving citizen’s allowance. The absurd thing is that if the model working couple increases their joint income to 5,000 euros, the household’s net income falls by 43 euros to 2,643.
The graph shows that from a gross monthly income of 2000 Euro ($2150) (gray bars) to 6000 Euro ($6450) the net income gradient (orange bars) is nearly flat and in some regions it actually falls–meaning the couple would be better off by not working.
It’s hard to solve these problems. A negative income tax in which benefits would fall more slowly with income can restore incentives but at the price of having many more people on some welfare and a a much higher budgetary cost.
How we should update our views on immigration
I am writing this post on a somewhat bumpy plane ride, so I will try doing it without links. Most of the relevant sources you can find through perplexity.Ai, or even on MR itself. Google too.
Overall, I am distressed by the contagion effects when it comes to immigration views. A large number of people are much more anti-immigration than they used to be, in part because yet others are more anti-immigration. All sorts of anecdotes circulate. But let’s look more systematically at what we have learned about immigration in the last ten years or so. Not all of it should count as pro-immigration, but a lot of it should, with one huge caveat.
When it comes to the wage effects of immigration, there is very modest additional evidence in the positive direction. I wouldn’t put much weight on that, but it certainly is not pointing in the other direction.
The United States is showing it can have a higher stock of immigrants and also falling crime rates. I am not suggesting a causal model there, but again that should be more reassuring than not.
There is additional evidence for the positive fiscal benefits of immigrants, including less skilled immigrants. Some of this is from the CBO, some of it I outlined in a Bloomberg column maybe a month or so ago. I don’t view those results as major revisions, but again they are not pointing in the wrong direction.
There is reasonable though not decisive macroeconomic evidence that immigrant labor supply was a significant contributor to America’s strong post-pandemic recovery.
If you are a right-winger who was worried that incoming Latinos would vote Democratic in some huge percentage, you can set your mind at ease on that one. You also can take this as evidence of a particular kind of assimilation.
Fertility rates are falling much more than we had expected, including in the United States. This makes the case for immigration much stronger.
It is increasingly evident that immigrant-rich Florida and Texas are doing just great. The picture is decidedly less positive for many parts of California, but I suppose I see evidence that the white Progressive Left is mainly at fault there, not the immigrants. Still, I do think you can make a reasonable argument that immigrants and the Progressive Left interact in a dysfunctional manner. It is no surprise to me that so many of the leading anti-immigrant voices come from California.
Overall, I am struck by the fact that immigration critics do not send me cost-benefit studies, nor do they seem to commission them. If the case against immigration is so strong, why aren’t these studies created and then sent to me? You could have a good one for a few hundred thousand dollars, right? Instead, in my emails and the like I receive a blizzard of negative emotion, and all sorts of anecdotal claims about how terrible various things are, but never a decent CBA. I take that to be endogenous. I think it is widely accepted that America having taken in the people who are now Italian-Americans would pass a cost-benefit test, even though the Mafia ruled New Jersey and Rhode Island for decades. Somehow people are less keen to apply this same kind of reasoning looking forward, though they are happy to regale you with tales of crimes by current immigrants.
I do see good evidence that trust in American government is falling, but I attribute that mainly to the Martin Gurri effect. I mean look at the current gaslighters in the White House and in the media — they are not primarily immigrants, quite the contrary. Or all the Covid mistakes, were they due to “the immigrants”? I don’t see it.
Now let us look at knowledge updates on the other side of the ledger, namely new knowledge that should make us more skeptical about immigration.
We now see that external hostility to Israel and Taiwan is stronger than we had thought. So the case for a looser immigration policy in Israel is much weaker than it used to be. As for Taiwan, they should be more careful about letting in mainland Chinese. Estonia needs to be more wary about letting in Russians, and indeed they are. And there might be other countries where this kind of logic applies. Do I really know so much about the situation between Burundi and Rwanda? In general, as the level of conflict in the world rises, there will be more of these cases. It is also a major consideration for anywhere near Ukraine. Small countries need to worry about this most of all.
I should note this problem does not seem to apply to North America, though you might require tougher security clearances for some jobs currently held by Chinese migrants.
The second issue, and it is a biggie, is that voters dislike immigration much, much more than they used to. The size of this effect has been surprising, and also the extent of its spread. I am writing this post on Election Day in France, and preliminary results suggest a very real risk that France ends up ungovernable. Immigrants are clearly a major factor in this outcome, even under super-benign views that do not “blame” the immigrants themselves at all.
Versions of this are happening in many countries, not just a few, and often these are countries that previously were fairly well governed.
I think it is better for countries in such positions to be much tougher on immigration, rather than to suffer these kinds of political consequences.
But let’s look honestly at the overall revision to our views. Politics is stupider and less ethical than before, including when it comes immigration (but not only! Fellow citizens also have become more negative about other fellow citizens of differing views, and I view negativism as the root of the problem all around). We need to take that into account, and so all sorts of pro-migration dreams need to be set aside for the time being, at least in many countries. Nonetheless the actual practical consequences of immigration, political backlash excluded, are somewhat more positive than we had thought. For some smaller countries, however, that may not hold, Israel being the easiest example to grasp but not the only. In the longer run, we also would like to prepare for the day when higher levels of immigration might resume, even if that currently seems far off. So we shouldn’t talk down immigration per se. Instead we should try to combat excess negativism in many spheres of life.
Somehow that view is too complicated for people to process, and so instead they instinctively jump on the anti-immigration bandwagon. Too much negativism. But in fact my view is better than theirs, and so they ought to hold it.