CLAM: Client-Aware Routing in Mix Networks
Pages 199 - 209
Abstract
Mix networks (mixnets) enhance anonymity at the cost of increased end-to-end latency, deterring clients from adopting mixnets for web browsing or instant messaging. This often leads clients to seek alternative anonymous communication systems, potentially compromising on anonymity levels. Addressing this, LARMix (NDSS 2024) introduced a strategic message routing aimed at minimizing link latency within mixnets. However, LARMix's proposal does not cover reducing link latency from clients to the mixnet. Filling this gap, CLAM presents innovative methodologies for efficient message forwarding from clients to mixnets. Our analysis reveals that clients using CLAM can reduce link latency to the mixnet by up to 90% without significantly burdening the network. Moreover, our results indicate that optimizing client routing in mixnets does not substantially increase the risk of message deanonymization, even with adversaries compromising up to 20% of nodes in the mixnet.
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Index Terms
- CLAM: Client-Aware Routing in Mix Networks
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Published In
June 2024
305 pages
ISBN:9798400706370
DOI:10.1145/3658664
- General Chair:
- Fernando Pérez-González,
- Program Chairs:
- Pedro Comesaña-Alfaro,
- Christian Krätzer,
- Hong Vicky Zhao
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Published: 24 June 2024
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