Can Macron be trusted when it comes to Russia?

The writer is editorial director and columnist at Le Monde

In diplomacy, words matter. Keen observers of shifts in the rhetoric used by world leaders may have noticed over the past year that “strategic autonomy” has been replaced by “European sovereignty” in Emmanuel Macron’s discourse. The French president has also stopped promoting a “new architecture of trust and security” for Europe and now prefers talking about the “European security order”. 

These semantic changes reflect an evolution in the way Macron addresses the issue of European unity and the Russian question. Gone is the carefree audacity of the early days of his presidency, when he thought he could charm both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and ignore the sensitivities of his closest partners in Europe.

He eventually dropped the word “autonomy” because of the alarm it caused in several other European capitals. The more palatable “strategic sovereignty” is now written all over the German government coalition treaty. And “architecture”, we are told by the Elysée, is not used any more because it echoes a failed 2008 Russian initiative — the “new European security architecture” proposed by then president Dmitry Medvedev.

When Macron addressed the European Parliament on January 19, his vaguely crafted offer to “finalise a European proposal building a new security and stability order” was immediately — and wrongly — interpreted by some as an initiative designed to divide the western alliance. This misinterpretation also overshadowed another, much more significant announcement, in which he committed to sending several hundred French troops to Romania, in a gesture of reassurance on Nato’s eastern flank.

Can Macron be trusted on Russia at a time when European unity is so crucial? This is a legitimate question, given traditional suspicions of French complacency towards Russia and a no less traditional irritation caused by the Gallic taste for an independent foreign policy.

While France holds the rotating EU presidency, the French president wants to impose a European voice in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Macron has managed to open a door for negotiation by reviving the so-called Normandy format, in which four-party discussions are held between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine on the conflict in Donbas.

Amid a flurry of recent diplomatic activity, Macron has over the past few days spoken four times with Putin, making him the European leader to have had the most contact with the Russian president since Angela Merkel’s departure as German chancellor. Missing so far is a visit to Kyiv, but he is working on it, as well as on a trip to Moscow.

Does he merely seek a path to de-escalation for Europe, or will he try to pursue his old dream of a reset of French relations with Moscow?   

Critics are quick to recall Macron’s ill-fated invitation to Putin to visit his summer residence on the Côte d’Azur in August 2019. The French president believed he could open a constructive dialogue on European security with his Russian counterpart. This was very much a unilateral initiative — even Merkel was kept in the dark.

But that was 2019. Two factors have since made the Elysée more realistic. First, the main result of Macron’s Kremlin charm offensive was to antagonise some of his European partners. Second, Russian assertiveness has grown spectacularly — including at the expense of French interests, as shown with the recent deployment of Russian mercenaries in Mali. The Kremlin’s game with the Wagner Group of mercenaries in Africa has been an eye-opener for French students of Russian intentions, much as the Skripal poisoning changed perceptions of Moscow in London.  

This more sober assessment was on display in Berlin last week during Macron’s joint press conference with chancellor Olaf Scholz. When asked about Russia’s goals in the Ukraine crisis, Scholz was soft-spoken, hesitant, searching for words. In stark contrast, Macron sternly accused Russia of becoming “a force of disequilibrium”.

Paris’s determination not to give in to Moscow’s pressure was visible early in this crisis. French diplomats like to recall that they were the first, on November 12 last year, to use the phrase “serious consequences” if Russia invaded Ukraine. In another sign of the priority given to western unity, French outrage at the Aukus pact concluded by Washington, London and Canberra last year, has been dialled right down. Britain and Australia may be slow to come out of the doghouse, but France’s relationship with the US has rarely been so good.

So can Macron be trusted on Russia? The better question might be whether Putin can be trusted on Ukraine. But by now, we all know the answer.