War in Ukraine has shaken the EU’s power dynamics

The writer is a columnist at Le Monde and fellow of the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin

Addressing Finland’s ambassadors in Helsinki a week ago, Sanna Marin, the country’s prime minister, spoke highly of Estonia, the first European country to ratify Finnish membership of Nato. Then she made a rare admission: “Over the past decades, we could have listened to our friends in the Baltics more closely along the way in questions related to our common security and Russia.”

That was music to the ears of Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who experienced first hand, as Estonia’s president from 2006 to 2016, “the dismissive arrogance” of western European governments when officials of the young democracies of Eastern and central Europe tried to warn them about Moscow’s objectives. That arrogance, Ilves says, “lasted until February 24” this year, when Russia invaded Ukraine.

Now, as a result of the Russian invasion, power dynamics in the EU are changing. Member states formerly occupied by the Soviet Union, and geographically closer to Ukraine and Russia, are not only taken more seriously today — they are also wielding more clout because their mistrust has been vindicated by Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked war, and because their position as front-line states makes them strategically more important. This shifting of the centre of gravity is challenging the once almighty Franco-German tandem.

This trend has been obvious in the current debate over a visa ban for Russian citizens in the Schengen area. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy called for it; Poland, Finland, the three Baltic states and the Czech Republic have actively supported it. Kaja Kallas, Estonia’s prime minister and an increasingly influential voice in the EU, made the strongest push.

Germany openly opposed such a ban, as did Josep Borrell, the EU’s chief diplomat. The Czechs, who hold the rotating presidency of the EU, decided to put it on the agenda of the 27 foreign ministers meeting this week in Prague. The Lithuanian foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, threatened to craft a regional agreement if a deal was not reached among the 27. Eventually, France and Germany had to fight back and work towards a compromise.    

This is not the old east-west divide, nor old Europe versus new. The war in Ukraine has upset existing coalitions. Viktor Orbán’s proximity to the Kremlin has paralysed the Visegrad group, comprising Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Poland and the Baltic states can now count on the support of Nordic countries such as Finland and Sweden, putting Paris and Berlin on the defensive.

The shift actually started before the war in Ukraine. In June 2021, then German chancellor Angela Merkel suffered a major defeat when she failed to rally her European partners, with the exception of France, to a proposal for an EU-Russia summit with Putin. Kallas led the charge, backed by Poland, Sweden and the Baltic states.

This year, both Merkel’s successor Olaf Scholz and French president Emmanuel Macron have faced harsh criticism — Scholz for his hesitations on weapons deliveries to Ukraine, Macron for his insistence on working the phones with Vladimir Putin.

Over the past few days both have felt the need to reaffirm their commitment to supporting Ukraine militarily “for as long as it takes”, as Scholz put it in a speech in Prague on Monday that was strong on European defence and enlargement. On the same day, Macron welcomed Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki for talks at the Elysée. This took no small effort on the French president’s part for this was the same Morawiecki who, in an article published earlier in the month, had denounced the Franco-German partnership as a “de facto oligarchy”, opposing any attempt to reform the EU’s unanimous voting rule.

The Polish leadership may be wasting a golden opportunity to make its case. With its exemplary treatment of millions of Ukrainian refugees, its close relationship with Kyiv and its crucial role as a hub for military support to Ukraine, Poland could now exert major influence in the EU — provided it addresses its problems with the rule of law. In Prague, Scholz called for a “gradual transition” to majority voting, directly contradicting Morawiecki, as the EU grapples with the enormous task of integrating new members, including Ukraine, which was granted candidate status in June. For the time being, France and Germany still feel strong enough to resist Warsaw’s challenge to EU treaties.

But there is another potential wild card. Victory for the far right in the Italian election on September 25 could see Europe’s fluctuating power dynamics shift still further.