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The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty Hardcover – September 24, 2019
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In Why Nations Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argued that countries rise and fall based not on culture, geography, or chance, but on the power of their institutions. In their new book, they build a new theory about liberty and how to achieve it, drawing a wealth of evidence from both current affairs and disparate threads of world history.
Liberty is hardly the "natural" order of things. In most places and at most times, the strong have dominated the weak and human freedom has been quashed by force or by customs and norms. Either states have been too weak to protect individuals from these threats, or states have been too strong for people to protect themselves from despotism. Liberty emerges only when a delicate and precarious balance is struck between state and society.
There is a Western myth that political liberty is a durable construct, arrived at by a process of "enlightenment." This static view is a fantasy, the authors argue. In reality, the corridor to liberty is narrow and stays open only via a fundamental and incessant struggle between state and society: The authors look to the American Civil Rights Movement, Europe’s early and recent history, the Zapotec civilization circa 500 BCE, and Lagos’s efforts to uproot corruption and institute government accountability to illustrate what it takes to get and stay in the corridor. But they also examine Chinese imperial history, colonialism in the Pacific, India’s caste system, Saudi Arabia’s suffocating cage of norms, and the “Paper Leviathan” of many Latin American and African nations to show how countries can drift away from it, and explain the feedback loops that make liberty harder to achieve.
Today we are in the midst of a time of wrenching destabilization. We need liberty more than ever, and yet the corridor to liberty is becoming narrower and more treacherous. The danger on the horizon is not "just" the loss of our political freedom, however grim that is in itself; it is also the disintegration of the prosperity and safety that critically depend on liberty. The opposite of the corridor of liberty is the road to ruin.
- Print length576 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPenguin Press
- Publication dateSeptember 24, 2019
- Dimensions6.44 x 1.81 x 9.53 inches
- ISBN-100735224382
- ISBN-13978-0735224384
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This book explains why liberty is not a "natural" order of things and how it can continue to thrive despite new threats.Popular highlight
Liberty almost always depends on society’s mobilization and ability to hold its own against the state and its elites.675 Kindle readers highlighted thisPopular highlight
Our argument in this book is that for liberty to emerge and flourish, both state and society must be strong.650 Kindle readers highlighted thisPopular highlight
How those shackles emerge, and why only some societies have managed to develop them, is the major theme of our book.385 Kindle readers highlighted this
Editorial Reviews
Review
One of Kirkus Reviews' Best Books of 2019
Shortlisted for the Lionel Gelber Prize
“What explains the rise and fall of democracy and dictatorship? . . . [Acemoglu and Robinson] offer a provocative framework for analyzing our current moment of democratic crisis. . . . A powerful starting point for understanding the many perils facing aspirations for democracy and liberty today. . . helpfully recalibrates our American tendency to collapse debates over freedom into a binary clash between the narrow liberty of ‘free markets’ on the one hand, and the economic and political freedoms provided by social-democratic ‘big government’ on the other.” —The Washington Post
“Crucially and rightly, the book does not see freedom as merely the absence of state oppression . . . This book is more original and exciting than its predecessor. It has gone beyond the focus on institutions to one on how a state really works.” —Martin Wolf, Financial Times
“Fantastic.” —Satya Nadella, CEO of Microsoft
“A work of staggering ambition—aiming to explain why liberty has or has not existed at every moment in time in every geography in the world… It is chock full of delightful detours and brilliant nuggets... Smart and timely.” —Newsweek
“A well-written and argued treatise. . . . indispensable reading.” —Library Journal (starred review)
“Provocative and intuitively correct. An endlessly rewarding book.” —Kirkus (starred review)
“The Narrow Corridor takes us on a fascinating journey, across continents and through human history, to discover the critical ingredient of liberty. In these times, there can be no more important search—nor any more important book.” —George Akerlof, Nobel laureate in economics, 2001
“Liberty does not come easily. Many populations suffer from ineffective governments and are stuck in a cage of norms and traditions. Others are subdued by a despotic Leviathan. In this highly original and gratifying fresco, Daron Acemoglu and Jim Robinson take us on a journey through civilizations across time and space. A remarkable achievement that only they could pull off and that seems destined to repeat the stellar performance of Why Nations Fail.” —Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics, Nobel laureate in economics, 2014
“With gripping examples of civilizations that thrived or failed, Acemoglu and Robinson provide an exhilarating analysis of the critical balance needed between state and society. The Narrow Corridor is destined to be the landmark book that maps the future of freedom for any serious policymaker, scholar, or citizen.” —Erik Brynjolfsson, coauthor of The Second Machine Age
“One of the biggest paradoxes of political history is the trend, over the last 10,000 years, away from small tribes and toward the development of the strong centralized states that allow societies of millions to function. But—how can a powerful state be reconciled with liberty for its citizens? This great book provides an answer to this fundamental dilemma. You will find it as enjoyable as it is thought-provoking.” —Jared Diamond, professor of geography at UCLA and Pulitzer Prize–winning author of Guns, Germs, and Steel
“How should we view the current challenges facing our democracies? This brilliant, timely book offers a simple, powerful framework for assessing alternative forms of social governance. The analysis is a reminder that it takes vigilance to maintain a proper balance between the state and society—to stay in the ‘narrow corridor’—and avoid falling into either statelessness or dictatorship.” —Bengt Holmstrom, Nobel laureate in economics, 2016
“Two of the world’s best social scientists have written a magisterial book of immense insight and learning, a true tour de force. From its rich historical study of the delicate balance between state and society it draws a chilling conclusion every thinking person should be aware of: Liberty is as rare as it is fragile, wedged uneasily between tyranny and anarchy.” —Joel Mokyr, author of A Culture of Growth
“Another outstanding, insightful book by Acemoglu and Robinson on the importance and difficulty of getting and maintaining a successful democratic state. Packed with examples and analysis, it is a pleasure to read.” —Peter Diamond, Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2010
Praise for Why Nations Fail
“Bracing, garrulous, wildly ambitious and ultimately hopeful. It may, in fact, be a bit of a masterpiece.” —The Washington Post
“Why Nations Fail is a splendid piece of scholarship and a showcase of economic rigor.” —The Wall Street Journal
“A brilliant book.” —Bloomberg
“This is an intellectually rich book that develops an important thesis with verve. It should be widely read.” —Financial Times
“Why Nations Fail is a truly awesome book.” —Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics
About the Author
James A. Robinson, a political scientist and economist, is one of nine University Professors at the University of Chicago. Focused on Latin America and Africa, he is currently conducting research in Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Haiti, and Colombia, where he has taught for many years during the summer at the University of the Andes in Bogotá.
Product details
- Publisher : Penguin Press (September 24, 2019)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 576 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0735224382
- ISBN-13 : 978-0735224384
- Item Weight : 2 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.44 x 1.81 x 9.53 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #70,006 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #12 in Non-US Legal Systems (Books)
- #25 in Political Economy
- #53 in Economic Conditions (Books)
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About the authors
Daron Acemoglu is the Killian Professor of Economics at MIT. In 2005 he received the John Bates Clark Medal awarded to economists under forty judged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge. (Photo by Peter Tenzer.)
James A. Robinson, a political scientist and an economist, is one of 8 current University Professors at University of Chicago. Focused on Latin America and Africa, he is currently conducting research in Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Haiti and in Colombia where he has taught for many years during the summer at the University of the Andes in Bogotá.
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In their book, our author’s refer to this balance of power as the ‘Red Queen’ effect, taken from the tale of Alice in Wonderland. In the fable, the Red Queen tells Alice that she must keep running if she is to stay in the same place. Metaphorically, this applies to the populace of a liberal democracy that must keep running if they are to keep up with the expanding powers of their governmental elite. The same is true for governments when their citizens gain power for themselves. If either stop running while the other continues, the balance of power is thrown off and liberalism is jeopardized. Just like Alice, we must all keep running in order to maintain our position (and it may often feel as though we are going nowhere).
One of the earliest liberal democracies examined by our authors is that of Athens at the time of Solon (630-560 BC). What made Solon exceptional was his recognition of the balance needed between state and society. The more he “managed to strengthen regular Athenians politically, the further he went in building state institutions. And the more these institutions took shape, the further he went in establishing popular control over them.” Solon came to lead at a time when the Athenian elite held a majority of the power, and in order to strengthen the power of the people he took actions like banning debt peonage, redistributing lands, and widening access to political decision making bodies. In order to keep some power for the elites, he structured society into four classes, and only men from the top two could be elected to government. He also codified the laws of the land and applied them to everyone: anyone could bring a lawsuit before the judicial councils and have it be heard.
Justice for the poor was instrumental in balancing the power of ancient Athenian society and has remained a pillar of liberal societies since. It was this striving for justice that helped England achieve its own liberal society. King Henry II oversaw the creation of the ‘eyres,’ around 1176, which was a “system of itinerant royal judges who toured the country with broad authority to judge different types of cases.” When considering a dispute, judges began by summoning ‘twelve lawful men’ from the local area to aid them in their deliberations, a practice that would eventually transform into the twelve members of a jury we now hold as standard practice in our current judicial system. This reform triggered a reaction from the people as “society came to participate in conflict resolution in new ways.” This was the Red Queen effect working in beautiful harmony: as the state judiciary gained power, so did the people via their participation in the process, and society as a whole benefitted.
Many people today do not live in liberal societies and are subject to either all-powerful governments (China, for example, or North Korea) or all-powerful societies that have remained factional and resistant to centralized government (Tajikistan and Montenegro, for instance). Some societies have been unable to progress toward liberalism due to a stifling ‘cage of norms,’ which are customs passed down over generations that are difficult to break. In India, for example, this is the caste system, a practice that elevates some, persecutes others, and keeps the whole of society fragmented against itself and therefore unable to organize on a grand scale. In many parts of Africa, tribal traditions have the same effect—disallowing the formation of a central authority.
The founders of the United States understood the necessity of balancing power as well (thus the division of power between executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government) and tried their best to create a Constitution that honored both the state and the people. Many state legislatures balked at ratifying the Constitution upon first consultation, however, believing that the document awarded too much power to the state. They refused to ratify the Constitution and accept the authority of a federal government without more power in the hands of the people. Thus, a bill of rights was written and added to the agreement so as to further enshrine the balance of power.
Despite these initial precautions, the past several decades have seen the elite members of US society become more and more powerful while the citizenry has failed to keep pace. The signs of increasing governmental and elite power include: the top 1% holding more wealth than the bottom 50%; the monopolization of many industries by massive corporations; the FBI and CIA conducting secret operations with almost no oversight; mainstream media reporting on behalf of the government instead of on behalf of the people; the patriot act and the mass domestic surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden; the FED printing endless money to pay for things that the people don’t approve of. And, on the flip side, the citizenry in our country seems to have less and less power than ever before: union participation is at an all-time low; drug overdoses leading to death are increasing (often due to people feeling hopeless about their lives); a similar increase in gun violence; the cultural divide between Left and Right that causes everyone to suffer needlessly. The general absence of political education is also a sign: I never paid much attention to politics or the government’s actions until my mid-20s, for example. All of these signs point towards a future where we in the United States leave the liberal corridor and become dominated by an authoritarian government.
One of the most important necessities for a proper balance of power is trust. For example, our authors examine the government of Denmark, who in 2006 voted to publish a law requiring internet providers to “store information on users’ source and destination IP addresses, port numbers, session types, and time stamps.” In response, international privacy advocate groups announced that Denmark had become an ‘extensive surveillance society.’ However, the Danish people were not up in arms and did not demand the cessation of the data-collection practices. Meanwhile, the bombshell revelations in the United States that the NSA is collecting the same data on its citizens was met with uproarious anger (despite the fact that nothing was changed). Why were the Danish and the U.S. responses to state surveillance so different? Because the Danish government announced their intentions publicly, promised to use their new power appropriately and with public oversight, and maintained the trust of their citizens. The United States government operated in secret, distrusting the very people they are meant to protect.
What does all this information mean for the future of our myriad global societies? This is a tough question to try and answer, and our authors are quick to point out that it is incredibly difficult, perhaps truly impossible, to predict which countries will remain within the liberal corridor and which will be pulled out either by a despotic government, an absent one, or some calamitous unforeseen event (like war or a pandemic). Whatever comes our way, it is imperative to remember that like many things in life, liberal societies require balance.
Reviewed in the United States on July 19, 2023
In their book, our author’s refer to this balance of power as the ‘Red Queen’ effect, taken from the tale of Alice in Wonderland. In the fable, the Red Queen tells Alice that she must keep running if she is to stay in the same place. Metaphorically, this applies to the populace of a liberal democracy that must keep running if they are to keep up with the expanding powers of their governmental elite. The same is true for governments when their citizens gain power for themselves. If either stop running while the other continues, the balance of power is thrown off and liberalism is jeopardized. Just like Alice, we must all keep running in order to maintain our position (and it may often feel as though we are going nowhere).
One of the earliest liberal democracies examined by our authors is that of Athens at the time of Solon (630-560 BC). What made Solon exceptional was his recognition of the balance needed between state and society. The more he “managed to strengthen regular Athenians politically, the further he went in building state institutions. And the more these institutions took shape, the further he went in establishing popular control over them.” Solon came to lead at a time when the Athenian elite held a majority of the power, and in order to strengthen the power of the people he took actions like banning debt peonage, redistributing lands, and widening access to political decision making bodies. In order to keep some power for the elites, he structured society into four classes, and only men from the top two could be elected to government. He also codified the laws of the land and applied them to everyone: anyone could bring a lawsuit before the judicial councils and have it be heard.
Justice for the poor was instrumental in balancing the power of ancient Athenian society and has remained a pillar of liberal societies since. It was this striving for justice that helped England achieve its own liberal society. King Henry II oversaw the creation of the ‘eyres,’ around 1176, which was a “system of itinerant royal judges who toured the country with broad authority to judge different types of cases.” When considering a dispute, judges began by summoning ‘twelve lawful men’ from the local area to aid them in their deliberations, a practice that would eventually transform into the twelve members of a jury we now hold as standard practice in our current judicial system. This reform triggered a reaction from the people as “society came to participate in conflict resolution in new ways.” This was the Red Queen effect working in beautiful harmony: as the state judiciary gained power, so did the people via their participation in the process, and society as a whole benefitted.
Many people today do not live in liberal societies and are subject to either all-powerful governments (China, for example, or North Korea) or all-powerful societies that have remained factional and resistant to centralized government (Tajikistan and Montenegro, for instance). Some societies have been unable to progress toward liberalism due to a stifling ‘cage of norms,’ which are customs passed down over generations that are difficult to break. In India, for example, this is the caste system, a practice that elevates some, persecutes others, and keeps the whole of society fragmented against itself and therefore unable to organize on a grand scale. In many parts of Africa, tribal traditions have the same effect—disallowing the formation of a central authority.
The founders of the United States understood the necessity of balancing power as well (thus the division of power between executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government) and tried their best to create a Constitution that honored both the state and the people. Many state legislatures balked at ratifying the Constitution upon first consultation, however, believing that the document awarded too much power to the state. They refused to ratify the Constitution and accept the authority of a federal government without more power in the hands of the people. Thus, a bill of rights was written and added to the agreement so as to further enshrine the balance of power.
Despite these initial precautions, the past several decades have seen the elite members of US society become more and more powerful while the citizenry has failed to keep pace. The signs of increasing governmental and elite power include: the top 1% holding more wealth than the bottom 50%; the monopolization of many industries by massive corporations; the FBI and CIA conducting secret operations with almost no oversight; mainstream media reporting on behalf of the government instead of on behalf of the people; the patriot act and the mass domestic surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden; the FED printing endless money to pay for things that the people don’t approve of. And, on the flip side, the citizenry in our country seems to have less and less power than ever before: union participation is at an all-time low; drug overdoses leading to death are increasing (often due to people feeling hopeless about their lives); a similar increase in gun violence; the cultural divide between Left and Right that causes everyone to suffer needlessly. The general absence of political education is also a sign: I never paid much attention to politics or the government’s actions until my mid-20s, for example. All of these signs point towards a future where we in the United States leave the liberal corridor and become dominated by an authoritarian government.
One of the most important necessities for a proper balance of power is trust. For example, our authors examine the government of Denmark, who in 2006 voted to publish a law requiring internet providers to “store information on users’ source and destination IP addresses, port numbers, session types, and time stamps.” In response, international privacy advocate groups announced that Denmark had become an ‘extensive surveillance society.’ However, the Danish people were not up in arms and did not demand the cessation of the data-collection practices. Meanwhile, the bombshell revelations in the United States that the NSA is collecting the same data on its citizens was met with uproarious anger (despite the fact that nothing was changed). Why were the Danish and the U.S. responses to state surveillance so different? Because the Danish government announced their intentions publicly, promised to use their new power appropriately and with public oversight, and maintained the trust of their citizens. The United States government operated in secret, distrusting the very people they are meant to protect.
What does all this information mean for the future of our myriad global societies? This is a tough question to try and answer, and our authors are quick to point out that it is incredibly difficult, perhaps truly impossible, to predict which countries will remain within the liberal corridor and which will be pulled out either by a despotic government, an absent one, or some calamitous unforeseen event (like war or a pandemic). Whatever comes our way, it is imperative to remember that like many things in life, liberal societies require balance.
Last time around, authors Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson explained “Why Nations Fail.” In short, they said three things:
1. There are two types of politics: inclusive and extractive
2. There are two types of economic institutions: inclusive and extractive
3. In order not to fail, your nation needs to have both, inclusive politics and inclusive economic institutions.
The book caused a stir, because when it came out in 2012 China was riding high. Their magnum opus basically said this could not last, because Chinese politics are far from inclusive.
On the other hand, it’s one thing to establish what the “boundary conditions” are that must be met for a nation not to fail and it is quite another to describe the steps to success. Their previous work does offer some insight regarding that process, but the thrust of the argument made is about the preconditions.
This time, the authors attempt to set that straight. The Narrow Corridor is the course a nation must steer if it is actually to succeed!
The conspiracy theorist in me says they’ve had this book ready to go, awaiting the moment when it’s clear that Chinese exceptionalism has run its course.
In case you’re worried this is all about one country, rest assured that they’re are at it again: the Narrow Corridor invites you on a wild tour from ancient Uruk and Giglamesh to modern Syria and Assad, via
• Solon’s Athens,
• modern Lebanon,
• the Tiv of rural Nigeria,
• prophet Muhammad’s Egira,
• chief Shaka’s Zululand,
• Kamehameha’s Hawaii,
• Shevardnadze’s Georgia,
• the city-states of medieval Italy,
• a very long study of English history including the Magna Carta,
• the Byzantine Empire,
• the Holy Roman Empire,
• Prussia,
• a full chapter on the history of authoritarianism in China,
• another on the caste system of India,
• the origins of the Swiss confederation,
• the clan wars of Albania and Montenegro,
• the success of Solidarnosc in Poland versus the failure of democracy to flourish in post-1989 Russia,
• the emergence of democracy in Costa Rica versus the “repression of the Finca” in Guatemala,
• the long shadow cast on American history by compromises made by both the founding fathers and FDR,
• the gnocchi of Argentina,
• the Tuxedo-clad orangutan that is the Colombian government,
• the suppression of Liberian tribes by freed American slaves,
• the rise of the House of Saud and the seeds of 9/11,
• the dissolution of the Weimar Republic and the ascension to power of you-know-who,
• Salvador Allende as the (very temporary) beneficiary of the secret ballot,
• the popular demand for aristocratic leadership in thirteenth century Italy and its modern echos in the twenty-first century Americas,
• the Rainbow Coalition that brought the end of Apartheid,
• the brief Turkish flirtation with pluralistic democracy at the turn of the millennium,
• the brutal rule of Congo by king Leopold of Belgium,
• 1930’s Sweden,
• post-war Britain,
• post-war Japan (wow)
The point of this tour is to illustrate via numerous examples the authors’ latest construct, the “Narrow Corridor” that lies between the power of the state Leviathan and the power of society.
There are two fundamental conclusions:
1. the power of society and the power of the state need to be in balance
2. provided they are in balance, great things happen as they grow together. In particular, the state can offer more and more to its citizens, provided society also keeps growing stronger, so it can contain the growing power of the state.
This nirvana the authors dub “the Shackled Leviathan.”
The situation whereby the state dominates is called the “Despotic Leviathan.” That’s the kind of thing that’s going on in China today, with the author giving a decent account of how fun things are for the hundreds of thousands of people who are sent for “re-education through labor” every year. The opposite is the “Absent Leviathan.” That’s what you could observe in Lagos, Nigeria a short 20 years ago or, if you don’t have access to a time machine, in Lebanon today. Other pathologies are the “Cage of Norms,” (best observed in India, where society collectively enforces the caste system and the state be damned,) the “Paper Leviathan” (whereby a state has people manning all positions in government, but does not offer any services whatsoever to its citizens) and the “Broken Red Queen” (a reference to an allegory the authors annoyingly repeat all the time that I refuse to go into: the Red Queen is a character from Alice in Wonderland and the blight of this book; I’m not an idiot and I had to keep going back to page 41 to find out how the godforsaken Red Queen is relevant.)
Economists love their 45 degree lines, I suppose, so the corridor is illustrated a bit like you stretched a condom down the diagonal of a chart that says “power of the state” on the Y axis and “power of society” on the X axis. Yeah, sorry, buy the book, have a look and tell me otherwise.
To get into the corridor, you need to bring together “the two blades of the scissors,” namely inclusive bottom-up political traditions and state institutions. The authors’ favorite examples are modern England (where the pre-existing Franks had little peacetime hierarchy, but the conquering Romans introduced state institutions, planting the seed for successive parallel evolution of both state and society, eventually leading to the parallel structure of Parliament and the monarchy, via 1066, the Black Plague and the Magna Carta) and my hometown of Athens, where Solon succeeded in making the transition from Dracon’s laws (which amounted to little more than a codification of the societal norms of a tribal society) to the first Shackled Leviathan in history, by introducing very liberal measures (1. making it illegal to pawn one’s freedom for money on one hand and 2. allowing some representation of all free Athenians in public life) all while codifying the dominance of the aristocracy in political structures.
The authors go to great lengths to emphasize that neither is this process automatic, nor pre-ordained, nor does it occur in one go. They don’t use the word “dialectic,” but you can see where they read this first…
I make fun of their little box with the 45 degree line down the middle, but it’s actually a good shorthand if you want to demonstrate that to understand how events can push a nation toward “the corridor” you need to understand where it stood before.
So if the nation starts “left” of the corridor, with the state more powerful than society, and the Black Plague hits, making labor scarce and moving power away from the state and toward the people, it matters how strong the state was to begin with. In England, where there was a legacy of bottom-up institutions, it was enough to move the proceedings into “the Narrow Corridor,” but in Eastern Europe it wasn’t, so for them eventually it was a non-event. (The same analysis is applied to post-1989 events, though the authors ought to additionally acknowledge a strong nationalist element to the divergence in outcomes between Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe)
Similarly, a state could be in the corridor, but war could happen, which is always an endeavor best pursued with the state firmly in charge, rather than via “inclusive institutions” and if that state, like 18th century Prussia, for example, was already borderline autarchic, then it could find itself outside the corridor again.
The converse is how the authors see the birth of the Swiss state, which was to the “right” of the Narrow Corridor, with a bunch of cantons living independently of one another, but banding together to fight an external threat. This moved them into the corridor, where they have happily lived ever since.
Another pathology is the one the authors perceive to be afflicting the United States of America. In the case of the US, which was born when elites decided they no longer wanted to pay tax to the British king, a balance was struck between the Federal state, which sought to unify the country, and the individual States, where local business very much preferred to carry on pursuing extractive economic policies, often enforced via violent means. The authors view through this lens both the original interpretation of the Constitution as tolerating slavery and FDR’s tolerance of redlining, a compromise which they believe casts a long shadow all the way to the lack of workers’ rights in today’s South relative, say, to Detroit, and to the license the police force took in the recent Ferguson incident.
In summary, tolerance of economically extractive institutions goes hand-in-hand with the necessary state violence to enforce them, which in turn translates into higher overall levels of violence, and that is the key to understanding gun ownership, higher incarceration rates etc.
Not only that, the authors go on to say, but when issues arise that must be dealt with at the Federal level, the institutions are not in place whereby society (twice removed) can have an influence. As a result, the institutions in question evolve in isolation and with low accountability and that’s a bad thing, because they never earn the full trust of the people. To understand the Waco, Texas incident you must understand that the FBI never bothered to consider society’s expectations on how it treated Martin Luther King; to understand why we’re not batting an eyelid as we’re abandoning the Middle East to its fate you must take into account that nobody even imagined the state would be monitoring our every communication, as Edward Snowden revealed it has been. Compare and contrast with Denmark, where the question was put to its people on whether it should accumulate all their data and the people had enough confidence to resoundingly respond with a “yes.”
It’s certainly an interesting angle!
But the authors eventually get too cocky for my taste. Riding on a high horse, they go on to equate the election of Donald Trump to populist movements in medieval Italy and the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. They argue that the people got so fed up with elites looking after themselves after the financial crisis, that they elected to office a populist demagogue whose only positive attribute was that he did not belong to the elite.
Not quite! Perhaps because, in contrast to Chavez and Maduro and their ilk, the 44th president was a decent man, the authors basically fail to identify that it was Barack Obama who won that rebound, a charismatic black community organizer who campaigned on Change. It is only after it transpired that he was a mild conservative, wasting two full terms proving he could be a “no drama” President for all Americans (no mean feat, God knows, and perhaps good enough a legacy, but not our point here) that, in desperation, the American people voted in a candidate who really looked like he might actually bring the temple down.
And the sad thing is that PERFECT parallels exist to Trump, in countries where I’d love to have seen the authors apply their tools. Silvio Berlusconi springs to mind first, but populist businessmen in power can currently also be found across all of Eastern Europe.
Anyway, you sleepwalk through the Narrow Corridor, but at some point you eventually ask yourself the inevitable question:
THE NARROW CORRIDOR TO WHERE EXACTLY?
The answer is underwhelming, but it brings us back to China and to the heart of this book. Quoting from page 234:
“Chinese growth is not likely to peter out in the next few years. But as with other episodes of despotic growth, its existential challenge lies in unleashing large-scale experimentation and innovation. Like all previous instances of despotic growth, it is unlikely to succeed in this.”
So the objective whose pursuit the authors study for 496 pages is growth.
Success, here, is one and the same as GDP growth.
Agh.
Still, this was a very thought-provoking read.
Top reviews from other countries
O papel do estado como vetor de crescimento, mas ao mesmo tempo que a sociedade controla o próprio estado, são fatores fundamentais para a manutenção do balanço de poder, que é observado apenas em países democráticos.
Considerei bastante interessante a análise feita sobre o "Paper Leviathan" da Argentina (Capítulo 11) e que pode ser facilmente replicado no Brasil, no qual o burocracia (no sentido do funcionamento do estado) simplesmente carece de processos, regras e impessoalidade, precisando sempre de alguém para dar um jeitinho no que se precisa fazer.
Outro interessante foi sobre a polarização política (Capítulo 13), que independentemente de que lado se coloque, a tendência é jogar os países em um regime totalitarista.
Entretanto, a ideia das normas formais e informais se mantém ainda como um ponto central para que o desenvolvimento ocorra nesse processo histórico.
Quanto a edição, adquiri a edição para Kindle e está ótima tanto na diagramação como no menu para andar entre os capítulos!