The potent powerlessness of Leftist politics in African states
A tale of people who want structural change but eschew the messy realities of economics and organized politics
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I: Where are the politically-organized African Leftists?
I recently reread (the elder) Olufemi Taiwo’s Africa Must be Modern — a provocative and highly readable book that I think should be required reading in all high schools throughout the Continent. The book got me thinking about the role of ideas in African political economy. That, in turn, led me to conclude that there is a dearth of actionable political ideas for social and economic transformation on the Continent; and that this situation is partially attributable to the demise of organized Leftist politics in the region since the 1970s.
For a region whose countries are mostly low-income, mired in stark inequalities, and with a rich history of revolutionary left wing politics (see here and here) and accompanying intellectual firepower, it is striking how little traction contemporary Leftist politics gets in African countries. Not even the advent of mass politics in the early 1990s produced nationally-competitive Leftist political formations. Over the last 30 years, only Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi posted successes that could arguable be linked to Leftist ideological origins (albeit very inconsistently). The roster of incumbent African administrations continues to be dominated by ideologically stunted traditionalists and reactionaries. How did this pattern emerge? And what have been the associated costs?
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The African Left’s political collapse allowed the region’s reactionaries, traditionalists, and all manner of chancers to wield and abuse power (and to be used and abused by all manner of foreign chancers and powers). Importantly, the demise of the African Left stunted the development of the African Right. And so while every so often the reactionaries/traditionalists/chancers might have exhibited Right-ish elements, they lacked any coherent ideological mooring. It is therefore not surprising that, despite their near-total dominance for decades, their contributions to the region’s economic, social, cultural and political development have been fairly limited. They crushed the competition and with it any chance of facing positive pressure to keep them on their toes. Amazingly, they also managed to convince everyone that they were not right-leaning enough in their economic approaches.
As I argue below, the African Right’s 60 years in power have left its establishment lazy and unable to course correct on their own. Only a strong exogenous disruption can end their deep-seated complacency.
A common misperception economic policies in African states tend to be statist, far-Left, or anti-market. This is not supported by the data (see examples of Kenya, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and South Africa below). In actual fact, most governments in the region tend to be eager adopters of allegedly apolitical “best practices” that are essentially center-right economic orthodoxy. If you add to this their social policies, the modal African government is essentially Center-right. What these countries often fail on is implementation (partially because said policies are seldom useful in context and/or due to weak state capacity).
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Some clarifications are in order before going any further. First, this post does not presume a normative preference for Leftist policies or politics in African states. This is partly because the complex process of transformational development (which is what this blog is all about) demands a fair amount of ideological agnosticism. To channel Deng Xiaoping, the color of the proverbial cat should not matter as long as it catches mice. At the same time, I believe that organized Leftist politics has the best promise of jumpstarting social, political, and economic transformation in the region. In addition to the potential to catalyze the emergence of more rational and coherent right wing political formations, African Leftists’ have historically exhibited an inherent desire for the kind of structural changes that the region desperately needs.
Second, I appreciate the difficulty of imposing a left-right ideological spectrum on a region as diverse as Africa. Most political movements/coalitions/parties in the region have historically been pragmatic and syncretic, rather than ideological purists. For the purposes of this post, I’ll use “Left” to connote formations that have sought to radically remake African politics and economics and to redistribute political and economic power to the masses. Conversely, the “Right” will refer to the reactionary/traditionalist/neo-colonial establishment that has dominated much of the Continent over the last 60 years.
II: Why care about the fate of organized Leftist politics across the Continent?
The core thesis of this post is that African Leftists have been critical to shaping the region’s politics and economics, but only in indirect ways. For a number of historical reasons, Leftist politics in the region has been devoid of any direct mass political mobilization or holding of power. Consequently, Leftists have been potent in influencing the agenda (through the media, academic writings, and cultural outlets), but ultimately powerless in shaping outcomes. Their critiques have sapped a great deal of legitimacy from incumbent governments, but without providing a positive veto. This has let to three suboptimal outcomes.
First, Leftist politics in Africa evolved to be very suspicious of power and therefore mainly expressive, oppositionist, and indisciplined — i.e, lacking the pragmatism that comes with actually governing. A non-trivial share of African Leftists go as far as considering participation in electoral politics to be beneath them. In very broad terms, the oppositionist grand standing on valence issues (e.g., “good governance”) is rarely backed up with reality-based policy alternatives packaged to mobilize citizens and to meet them where they work and live. It is therefore unsurprising that the biggest potential bases of Leftist mobilization — rural farmers and low-wage urban workers — were long captured by reactionary incumbents for parochial ends.
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Second, after being out of power for so long, most African Leftists have not updated their views on economic management for decades. It has always been easy to attribute the Continent’s economic failures to capitalist neocolonialism and traditionalist/reactionary pillaging. Consequently, there is very little evidence that the core African Left has reckoned with the failures of varieties of African Socialism from decades past. Many continue to rail against “neoliberalism” without providing concrete alternative paths to material abundance in the region. What does a reality-based Leftist developmentalist model that can win votes look like in 21st century Africa? What is the role of the private sector in such a model?
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Third, the lack of governing experience and decades of state repression have led to a perversive anti-statist discourse and politics on the African Left. Among Leftist intellectuals, the colonial origins of the African state has been used as a reason to perpetually delegitimize state-building (many of the same intellectuals suffered state repression). In this rendering, the African state can never overcome the original sin of colonial origin; and should be abolished and replaced with a Pan-African state (which presumably would be better at deploying coercion and providing public goods and services). At the same time, many economically-ascendant Africans who are broadly sympathetic to Leftist politics harbor anti-statist sentiments when it comes to the economy and tend to overstate the statist origins of African economic underdevelopment — this partially reflects the ideological hold of economic orthodoxy in the region. The reality, of course, is that African countries are terribly under-governed. Data on security and law enforcement, registration of births and deaths, education attainment, taxation, expenditure absorption, economic regulation, etc. all point to the fact that the contemporary African state is too small and too weak to meet the challenges of modern economics and politics.
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It is fair to say that the dominant Leftist ideas about the African state have deprived the region the intellectual/moral justification for one of the biggest benefits of Leftist politics: state-building for optimal economic regulation, service delivery, political socialization, and maintenance of political equality. The policy underdevelopment of the African Right has also deprived the region of potential benefits of conservative politics: sound economic management in support of commercial revolutions, strong protections of property rights, guarantee of security and order, etc. It is worth reiterating that the African Right cannot course correct because its leading lights across different countries benefit from weak statehood and their status as rent-seeking intermediaries vis-a-vis global economic actors interested in the region’s primary commodities (see here, here, here, here, and here).
Under the circumstances, it should be obvious why a homeostatic oscillation towards Leftist politics would help knock the region off of the current suboptimal equilibrium.
Of course there are exceptions to the broad descriptions above. Despite the rightward turn on economics, the Southern African liberation parties still have streaks of Leftist politics in them. Out West, the current government of Senegal and the Sahelian juntas (despite everyone’s insistence that they are merely power-hungry Russian tools) have also shown streaks of Leftist politics. However, there is no denying that, as far as outcomes go, organizationally powerful Leftist politics has so far had little political or economic success across Africa. There has been very little Leftist popular mobilization or serious attempts to win power and implement Leftist policies since the 1970s (with the brief exception of Burkina Faso in the late 1980s). Flashes of Leftist populism have been just that. Most actual Leftists in the region avoid party politics, and instead are ensconced in academia, activism, or the non-governmental sector.
III: Histories of oppression, silencing, and exit
It is important to note that the African Left’s historical political weakness is a function of both state repression and a general lack of ideology-driven mass politics in the region (there is no mobilized popular Right wing politics either; the Right is dominant by default). And so while elites routinely espouse ideologically-informed policy positions, they seldom mobilize the masses along ideological lines.
As noted above, most of the postcolonial political formations that wanted rapid structural change in the region were led by Leftists. The few that gained power were promptly ousted in coups or failed on their mission due to policy overreach (few ever want to admit this), global commodity cycles and fiscal crises, and the perennial problem of weak state capacity. For Leftist intellectuals and organized interests (like trade unions), state repression followed promptly after independence under the shadow of the Cold War. This was done by both the Left (fearful of challengers from within) and the Right (in the name of fighting “communism”).
The economic crises of the 1980s further pushed Leftism outside of mainstream economics and politics. Despite the nuanced facts about African states economic performance between 1960-1980, the dominant interpretation of events leading up the crises of the 1980s was that politicized state-led developmentalism was the culprit (forget that the data did not match this explanation). The solutions that followed leaned heavily on the need to depoliticize economic policy and implement global “best practices” (i.e. center-right orthodoxy) — which happened to be aligned with the interests of the traditionalists/reactionaries in charge. Potentially politically-potent policy fights over land redistribution, access to education and healthcare, or mass joblessness of urban youth were neutralized under the banner of global compacts like MDGs/SDGs to be discussed at endless conferences and NGO-ized to death.
A number of historical factors also created structural barriers against the emergence/survival of ideological politics in the region. For a start, the economic basis for ideological politics in the region was always weak. Rural landlessness has historically never been a major problem in most countries — African smallholder households typically own their land or have strong cultural claims to communal land under the trust of “traditional” rulers (insecure property rights due to absent documentation of ownership isn’t the same as landlessness). In addition, low rates of urbanization and proletariatization mean that trade union politics never acquired a truly mass character beyond the region’s “labor aristocracies” (and were promptly neutered by the state in the single party era). As late as the year 2000 Africa was still 69% rural and with large shares of households dependent on agriculture. In 2020 86% of total employment was in the precarious “informal” sector, and therefore hard to organize in unions.
The social foundations of ideological politics have also historically been weak. As far as pet issues and idioms go, the globally-cosmopolitan politics of educated Leftists - who seldom had strong social ties to the African countryside to begin with - kept them far-removed from objective realities of the vast majority of Africans (Ardent rural mobilizers like Amílcar Cabral were the exception). The political salience of identity (especially ethnicity) in many countries also militated against mass mobilization on the basis of ideology or class. All this was compounded by weak state capacity that made it difficult to use education as a means to political socialization or programmatic policies as credible evidence that the state could be a better refuge than narrow identities in an insecure and uncertain world.
IV: Moving forward: a call for positive Leftist politics
So what if there aren’t organizationally powerful Leftist coalitions with governing experience in African states? A reasonable person in Lagos, Nairobi, or Maputo might argue that the color of the cat doesn’t matter; the history of the Left’s demise is water under the bridge; plus it helps avoid unnecessary ideological polarization that might harm societal harmony.
The case against these arguments is that ideas, and especially implied theories of change within them, matter a great deal. Regular readers know that a common theme in this blog is that too often policymaking in African states tend to be optimized for all sorts of things that have nothing to do with the objective realities or aspirations of Africans. One way to address this problem would be to cultivate a politics that is directly tied to material outcomes in Africans’ lives and a culture of homegrown reality-based policymaking.
With that in mind, I would argue that ideological mobilization (Left, Right, Libertarian, and permutations of all) is important for ensuring that coherent ideas shape the conduct of political competition in the region; and that economic and social policies remain anchored in the interests of real Africans living in the real world. Ideologies need not be straightjackets (again, the color of the cat doesn’t matter!), but they can serve to sharpen policy debates and act as the North Star against which to evaluate (and legitimize) governments’ conduct. As I keep arguing here, there’s an urgent need to make African states work for Africans, rather than act as mere implementation arms of others’ agendas. Achieving this outcome necessarily requires a culture of reality-based thinking about the region’s myriad challenges and how to concretely address them.
So where do we go from the current state of Leftist politics in the region? In general, it would be ideal if the African (intellectual) Left updated its ideological canon along the following lines:
1) There’s nothing wrong with wielding power: The Leftist fear of power, often justified by the idea that it is impossible to be “clean” in politics is a grave mistake (in reality, fear of failure also plays a role). African politics is poorer because of Leftists’ historical banishment in the political wilderness. Plus, in the grand scheme of things, it’s only those who venture into the arena that count. Aspiring to be saintly critics is a guarantee to continue operating on the sidelines and to increasing adopt worldviews that diverge from reality. Experience disciplines theory and vice versa.
2) Strong states are core to achieving (Leftist) policy successes: African states are mostly misgoverned in no small part because they are terribly under-governed. As stated above, the African Right faces strong disincentives against state-building — which leaves the Left as the Continent’s great hope on this score. Plus, achieving the Left’s many policy objectives would necessarily require capable states that can regulate productive economies, raise revenue, and provide essential public goods and services. The ugly history of the bula matari African state is not a good reason to continue being ideologically anti-statist into the future. In the current moment, only strong African states will be able to provide the space for well-ordered societies to flourish while also protecting Africans from the ravages of an ever more dangerous world. Conversely, persistent state weakness in the region will most certainly guarantee that the next 500 years of African history mirror the last 500 years.
3) Transformational economic development in the 21st century requires a healthy appreciation of markets: It is true that Africa’s economic mismanagement over the last 40 years happened under ideologically Right-leaning incumbents and policies. But that is no reason to throw out the baby with the bath water. There’s certainly a need for activist developmentalist states in the region (especially now that industrial policy is back in vogue). But developmentalist approaches will only succeed if married to market logics and an acceptance of the fact there’s only so much that states can do. Honesty about the policy overreach/failures of the 1960s-1970s would be a vital first step in this direction.
4) Political success will come with rootedness in Africa’s objective realities: The gap between rhetoric and objective realities of ordinary Africans has been a perennial problem for the African Left. How can globally cosmopolitan mobilizers connect with farmers and urban casual laborers? How do they avoid the temptation to import the culture wars and expressive politics of the countries that dominate their media consumption and intellectual life?
I can’t claim to have answers to these questions. What I know is that the African Left has its work cut out with regard to political education and mobilization of real Africans living and working in the real world. While they absolutely should not compromise on the core values of human rights and dignity, there is an urgent need to figure out how to meet ordinary Africans where they work and live. Africans are more likely to abandon the false comfort offered by complacent traditionalists/reactionaries if organized (Leftist) politics becomes a means towards material advancing.
V: Conclusion
It is common to hear complaints about the lack of ideology in African politics. Such complaints typically point to the fact that too much of politics in the region is governed by valence issues or opportunistic coalition building based on clientelism and identity instead of ideologically-infused programmatic agendas. What many of these complaints miss is an appreciation of the fact that most African countries have neither the economic nor the social bases of ideological mobilization. Furthermore, the kernel of ideological mobilization that existed before the late 1970s was promptly extinguished through state repression and by the economic crises of the 1980s.
This post has argued that this process ought to be reversed. In particular, I have argued that the current historical moment calls for Leftist political mobilization as a homeostatic correction to the region’s political and economic failures over the last 60 years. This applies to all African polities regardless of regime type. Rather than be content with shouting from the sidelines, Africa’s Leftists must enter the mainstream arena of government and economic policymaking. To do so, the Left must connect with ordinary Africans where they work and live, appreciate the transformational power of well-regulated markets, and above all embrace the idea that strong developmentalist states are crucial for achieving material prosperity in the region.
I really loved reading this. I do think African the left needs to be stronger, and there needs to be stronger state capacity.
Too much of African left wing twitter is full of nonsense like not understanding why economic growth matters or thinking you can develop internally with out exports. The African left needs to be in the arena.
Agreed that priors need to be updated (like the african left can try to understand commodity markets more instead of just blaming "neocolonialism") and the failures of the 1960s & 1970s. (Issues with Ujamma in Tanzania, issues with Nkrumah's SOEs, nationalizing resources doesn't solve all issues, etc.)
The best African leftists by far are Meles of Ethiopia and Rene of Seychelles in my opinion, when we judging on growth rates and execution.
I doubt leftism is a panacea for any problems on the continent. We saw the disasters of Nyerere's Afrosocialism in Tanzania, Mengistu's Derg Marxism in Ethiopia, Barre's Clan Identitarianism/Socialism Hybrid in Somalia, Kerekou's Marxist-Leninism in Benin Republic.
In Africa, Leftism fails as much as their "rightwing" counterparts because political ideology has not been able to overcome the attractiveness of official corruption and ethnic identity politics. Besides, your average African person appreciates only one ideology--pragmatism