Let me ask you a question.
Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP – what is the highest that this number has been in India’s case? And bonus question: in what year?
Maybe you are a Modi supporter, and your guess is that we have achieved the highest number sometime in the last ten years. Or maybe you are a fan of Manmohan Singh, and believe that we achieved the highest number while MMS was the Prime Minister. Well, take a look for yourself (hover the cursor on the line for the years):
Play the “My Gormint Best and Your Gormint Worst” game to your heart’s content on your social media platform of choice, but the fact remains that all governments in India’s recorded history have failed in this specific regard. Give this dataset to any undergrad econ student and ask them to add a trend line to this series.
I went ahead and asked ChatGPT to add two, in fact. One for the entire dataset, and one for post 1991:
And please tell me – pretty please, do tell – how in the wide world have we managed to reduce the share of manufacturing in GDP at a faster rate post 1991? Now, that question is partly rhetorical, because part of the answer is the fact that services took off post-1991.
But even so. This is a deeply depressing, deeply enraging chart.
Why is it depressing and enraging?
Because the empirical data tells us that if we want India’s per capita GDP to go up over time, we should be increasing the share of manufacturing in GDP.
Either that, or we have to chart a path that no other country has before us. What kind of path? A path that shows the world how to grow GDP from relatively low levels while reducing the share of manufacturing in GDP
Note that the numbers (manufacturing as a share of GDP) are different because of different computational methodologies being used in both charts.
But regardless of how one computes the data, the fact of the matter is that we need to figure out a way to ramp up the share of manufacturing in GDP.
This pattern isn’t just empirical observation—it’s backed by decades of economic theory. From Arthur Lewis’s dual-sector model in the 1950s to more recent work by economists like Dani Rodrik and César Hidalgo, the consensus is clear: manufacturing has played a crucial role in economic development. It absorbs excess agricultural labor, drives productivity improvements, and creates the kind of stable, middle-class jobs that form the backbone of a prosperous society.
Opinions differ about whether manufacturing can (and will) continue to play the starring role it has in the past. But it remains a variable of crucial importance, and India is not well served by having manufacturing remain at around 10%-15% of GDP.
From a macroeconomic perspective, this manufacturing push is about more than just GDP growth. It’s about increasing labor’s share of national income and, crucially, developing a meaningful middle class in India. We can talk about increasing GDP all we like, but the real point is to pull people out of poverty, not just to make a big number bigger. A strong manufacturing sector, with its stable jobs and productivity growth, is our best (only?) shot at achieving this goal.
So what holds India back? Why have we remained incapable of pushing manufacturing up? Opinions differ wildly about the “correct” answer to this question, as you might imagine. But regardless of political affiliation and position on the economic spectrum, one can count on a few inevitable factors: rigid labor laws, skill gaps, land acquisition difficulties, and the rapid pace of automation in global manufacturing. Of these, the last is obviously out of our direct control. As regards the first three, we know these are problems, but we cannot get ourselves to Do Something About It.
But the more we delay, the stronger the very real (and already present) threat posed by automation in global manufacturing. One cannot be serious about meeting this threat without reforming our labor laws, meaningfully improving upon higher education and simplifying land acquisition. Perhaps most difficult of all, the mindset of the government and the bureaucracy has to change from that of an administrator to that of an enabler. Worse still, this has to happen at local levels of government. But cultural shifts are hard enough as it is – engineering a cultural shift across all levels government bureaucracy is like getting an oil tanker to do a wheelie.
So what is to be done?
Here is my proposal: set a madly ambitious target. 25% (say) of India’s GDP should come from manufacturing over the next 20 years. Specifically, one-fourth of our total cumulative output over the next two decades should come from manufacturing.
I am under no illusions – I think this target is not achievable. I also think that this target, for a variety of reasons, is best thought of in conjunction with the subsidiarity principle (about which there will be much more in a follow-up post). But assume with me, for the moment, that this is the target, no matter how implausible it sounds. Now ask yourself the question – in order to achieve this, what, exactly, needs to change in our country, and by when?
Forget 2029, and definitely forget 2047. Focus on one number, and one number alone: 25% by 2044. Is what we are doing helping us achieve this goal? If yes, go ahead and do it. If not, ask yourself why we are doing it. The correct time to ask and start answering this question was yesterday, but no matter. Now is an entirely acceptable substitute.
25%.
Let’s go.