The wall in the police station was covered in sheets of paper, one for every building in the sprawling Beijing apartment complex. Each sheet was further broken down by unit, with names, phone numbers and other information on the residents.

派出所的牆上貼滿了紙，每張紙對應這個龐大的北京居住小區的一棟樓。紙上按照單元細分，上面有住戶的姓名、電話號碼以及其他信息。

Perhaps the most important detail, though, was how each unit was color-coded. Green meant trustworthy. Yellow, needing attention. Orange required “strict control.”

不過，最重要的細節可能是每個單元都用顏色進行了編碼。綠色是可以放心的。黃色是需要關注。而橙色則需要嚴管。

A police officer inspected the wall. Then he leaned forward to mark a third-floor apartment in yellow. The residents in that unit changed often, and therefore were “high risk,” his note said. He would follow up on them later.

一名警官審視著這堵牆，然後上前用黃色標註了三樓的一套公寓。他在便簽上寫道，該單元的住戶流動性大，因此屬於「高風險」。他稍後會跟進他們的情況。

“I’ve built a system to address hidden dangers in my jurisdiction,” the officer said, in a video by the local government that praised his work as a model of innovative policing.

「針對轄區各類隱患，總結提煉『鑒事、見人、建情』工作機制，」這名警官說道。在當地政府發布的這條影片中，他的工作被稱讚為創新警務的典範。

This is the kind of local governance that China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, wants: more visible, more invasive, always on the lookout for real or perceived threats. Officers patrol apartment buildings listening for feuding neighbors. Officials recruit retirees playing chess outdoors as extra eyes and ears. In the workplace, employers are required to appoint “safety consultants” who report regularly to the police.

這就是中國最高領導人習近平想要的那種基層治理：更具可見性，更具侵入性，時刻警惕真實存在的或感覺到的威脅。警察扎進社區，掌握鄰裡糾紛情況。招募在戶外下棋的退休人員充當額外的耳目。在工作單位，僱主被要求任命「安全顧問」，定期向警方彙報。

The Chinese Communist Party has long wielded perhaps the world’s most sweeping surveillance apparatus against activists and others who might possibly voice discontent. Then, during the coronavirus pandemic, the surveillance reached an unprecedented scale, tracking virtually every urban resident in the name of preventing infections.

長期以來，中國共產黨對活動人士和其他有可能表達不滿的人實施了或許是世界上最為廣泛的監控。隨後，在疫情期間，監控達到了前所未有的規模，以預防感染的名義跟蹤幾乎每一位城市居民。

Now, it is clear that Mr. Xi wants to make that expanded control permanent, and to push it even further.

現在，很明顯，習近平想讓這種擴大控制永久化，並進一步推進。

The goal is no longer just to address specific threats, such as the virus or dissidents. It is to embed the party so deeply in daily life that no trouble, no matter how seemingly minor or apolitical, can even arise.

其目標不再僅僅是解決特定的威脅，如病毒或持不同政見者，而是要將黨深深嵌入到日常生活中，使任何麻煩——無論看起來多麼微不足道或無涉政治，都不會出現。

Mr. Xi has branded this effort the “Fengqiao experience for a new era.” The Beijing suburb in the propaganda video, Zhangjiawan, was recently recognized in state media as a national exemplar of the approach.

習近平將其稱為「新時代楓橋經驗」。那段宣傳影片中提到的北京郊區的張家灣，最近被官方媒體譽為這種做法的全國典範。

“Fengqiao” refers to a town where, during the Mao era, the party encouraged residents to “re-educate” purported political enemies, through so-called struggle sessions where people were publicly insulted and humiliated until they admitted crimes such as writing anti-communist poetry.

Mr. Xi, who invokes Fengqiao regularly in major speeches, has not called for a revival of struggle sessions, in which supposed offenders were sometimes beaten or tortured. But the idea is the same: harnessing ordinary people alongside the police to suppress any challenges to the party and uphold the party’s legitimacy.

習近平經常在重要講話中提到楓橋，他沒有呼籲恢復批鬥——在批鬥會上，所謂的犯罪分子有時會遭到毆打或折磨。但思路是一樣的：發動人民群眾跟警察一起，來消滅對黨的任何挑戰，維護黨的合法性。

The party casts this as a public service. By having “zero distance” from the people, it can more quickly gather suggestions about, say, garbage collection or save residents the trouble of going to court over business disputes. Instead, conflicts are hashed out by party mediators.

Mr. Xi frequently points to the Fengqiao experience as proof that the party is responsive to people’s needs and desires, even as he has smothered free expression and dissent.

It is also an effort to assert his political legacy. Top officials have hailed Fengqiao as an example of Mr. Xi’s visionary leadership, while scholars have described it as “a model for showcasing Chinese governance to the world.”

這也是為了維護其政治遺產的一種努力。高層官員稱讚楓橋是習近平高瞻遠矚的典範，而學者則將其描述為「展示『中國之治』的一張金名片」。

The campaign strengthens Beijing’s repressive abilities at a time of mounting challenges. With China’s economy slowing, protests about unpaid wages and unfinished homes have increased. Tensions with the West have led Beijing to warn of omnipresent foreign spies. The party has also tightened scrutiny of groups like feminists, students and L.G.B.T. rights activists.

In the name of Fengqiao, the police have visited Tibetans, Uyghurs and other minority groups in their homes, promoting party policies. Companies have been required to register their employees in police databases. Government workers have given “anti-cult” lectures at churches. Police officers and judges have been installed in elementary schools as “deputy principals of law,” keeping files on students’ perceived risk levels.

警察以楓橋經驗之名，到藏族、維吾爾族和其他少數民族家中探訪，宣傳黨的政策。警方要求企業把員工信息錄入警方數據庫。政府工作人員在教堂裡做「反邪教」的講座。公檢法系統安排工作人員到小學擔任「法治副校長」，對學生的風險水平做出判斷並記錄在案。

But by blocking even mild or apolitical criticism, the party could also erode the very legitimacy it is trying to project.

然而，對哪怕是溫和的或無涉政治的批評進行封阻，中共也可能削弱其試圖展示的合法性。

Mr. Xi’s interest in the Fengqiao experience dates back two decades, to when he was still ascending the ranks of power.

習近平對楓橋經驗的興趣可以追溯到20年前，當時他還在權力的上升階段。

The year was 2003, and Mr. Xi had just been named party secretary of Zhejiang Province in China’s east. China’s economic opening had brought great wealth to the province, but also led to rising crime. Mr. Xi was looking for a solution. According to official media reports, he turned to a small Zhejiang town called Fengqiao.

The town had entered party lore in the 1960s, after Mao exhorted the Chinese people to confront “class enemies,” such as landlords or rich farmers. In the official telling, Fengqiao residents at first clamored for the police to make arrests. But local party leaders instead urged the residents themselves to identify and “re-educate” the enemies.

20世紀60年代，在毛主席號召人民群眾與地主、富農等「階級敵人」展開直接鬥爭，這個小鎮由此成為黨的歷史傳述的一部分。根據官方說法，楓橋的民眾起初要求警察將他們抓起來。但當地黨的領導人卻敦促人民群眾自己辨別並「改造」敵人。

Ultimately, nearly 1,000 people were labeled reactionaries, according to Fengqiao officials. They and their families had trouble finding work, going to school or even getting married. Mao declared the “Fengqiao experience” a model for the country. Not long after, he launched the Cultural Revolution, another mass movement that led to a decade of bloodshed.

據楓橋官員說，最後有近1000人被貼上了反動派的標籤。他們和家人在找工作、上學甚至結婚方面都遇到了困難。毛宣布在全國推廣「楓橋經驗」。不久之後，他發動了文化大革命，這是另一場導致了十年流血衝突的群眾運動。

After Mao died, the phrase fell out of favor, as his successors distanced themselves from the chaos of his rule.

毛澤東死後，他的繼任者希望與他統治時期的混亂保持距離，「楓橋經驗」再也無人提及。

Mr. Xi, though, embraced the phrase. His first visit to Fengqiao in 2003 was to the local police station, where he inspected an exhibition about the 1960s. Months later, he visited again and praised the idea of nipping problems in the bud. “Though the situation and responsibilities we face have changed, the Fengqiao experience is not outdated,” he said.

但習近平沒有忘記它。2003年他第一次來到楓橋，參觀了當地派出所舉辦的關於20世紀60年代的一個展覽。幾個月後，他再次前往，對把問題消滅在萌芽狀態的理念大加讚賞。「雖然面臨的形勢任務都發生了變化，但『楓橋經驗』沒有過時，」他說。

Mr. Xi’s call for more social control was part of a broader shift by the party, amid the rapid change of the 2000s, toward “stability maintenance” — a catchall term for containing social problems and silencing dissent.

在本世紀頭十年的快速變化中，習近平呼籲加強社會控制，這是中共向「維穩」轉變的一部分。「維穩」是遏制社會問題和壓制異見的統稱。

After Mr. Xi became top leader in 2012, he redoubled that focus. Mentions of Fengqiao in state media became ubiquitous. Then came the coronavirus pandemic — and the government began tracking individuals’ movements down to the minute.

在2012年成為最高領導人後，習近平加倍重視穩定。在官方媒體上，楓橋經驗變得無處不在。然後新冠疫情暴發——政府開始對個人行蹤進行精確到分鐘的追蹤。

It did so partly through technology, requiring residents to download mobile health apps. But it also leaned on old-fashioned labor. Using a method called “grid management,” the authorities divided cities into blocks of a few hundred households, assigning workers to each. Those workers went door to door to enforce testing requirements and quarantines, sometimes by sealing people into their homes.

之所以能做到這點部分靠的是技術，政府要求居民把健康碼下載到手機上。但也靠傳統的人力。當局使用一種名為「網格管理」的辦法，將城市劃分為多個網格，每個網格有幾百戶人家，有專門的工作人員負責。這些工作人員挨家挨戶地執行政府的病毒檢測要求，對居民進行隔離，有時甚至將他們封在家中。

State media hailed China’s early success in containing Covid as proof of the Fengqiao experience’s continued utility. Chinese research papers described Fengqiao-style policing during the pandemic as a model for crisis management around the world.

官方媒體曾稱讚中國在遏制新冠疫情上的早期成功，將其視為「楓橋經驗」仍然有效的證據。中國學者寫了有關疫情期間警察用「楓橋經驗」維護治安的研究論文，將其描述為世界各地危機管理的典範。

When people began to chafe at the restrictions — culminating in nationwide protests in 2022 — the granular approach proved its utility in another way, as the police used facial recognition cameras and informants to track down participants.

人民開始對這些限制感到不滿，最終在2022年底出現了全國各地的抗議活動後，這種細粒化控制以另一種方式證明了其實用性，讓警方能通過人臉識別攝像頭和線人來追蹤抗議活動參與者。

“The architecture is there,” said Minxin Pei, a professor at Claremont McKenna College who recently published a book about China’s surveillance state. “After three years of lockdowns, seeing how the system works probably gave them a lot of insights.”

克萊蒙特麥肯納學院的裴敏欣教授認為，「整個體系已經搭建完成。」他最近出版了一本關於中國的政府監控的書。「三年的封控讓政府看到了這個系統如何工作，可能給他們提供了很多啟示。」

The Covid controls are gone. The stepped-up surveillance is not.

遏制新冠疫情的封控消失了。加強監控的做法沒有消失。

It is clear now that the government’s heightened intrusiveness during the pandemic was an acceleration of a longer-term project. Mr. Xi’s goal is to deploy the masses to bolster the party, as Mao had done, but without the turmoil. That is where technology and the police come in, to ensure people never slip out of control.

現已明顯的是，政府在新冠病毒大流行期間加強的侵擾是在加速一個長期項目。習近平的目標是像毛澤東那樣，為加強中共統治有效地利用群眾，但不要引發動亂。這就是科技手段和警察的作用所在，以確保人民永遠不會失控。

“This is the next iteration” of the party’s obsession with stifling unrest, said Suzanne Scoggins, a professor at Clark University in Massachusetts who has studied Chinese policing.

這是痴迷鎮壓騷亂的中共「的新做法」，在麻薩諸塞州克拉克大學研究中國警務的教授蘇珊娜·斯科金斯說。

And Beijing is pushing to expand it rapidly. It has encouraged local governments to hire many more workers to watch assigned grids. Last month, the party also issued its first-ever top-level guidance on the management of such workers, calling for stronger ideological training and formalized rewards and punishments.

中國政府正在推動快速擴大這個做法。中央鼓勵地方政府雇更多工作人員，派去指定網格掌握情況。上個月，中共還首次發布了如何管理這類工作人員的高層指導意見，要求強化思想政治教育，健全考核獎懲機制。

Those new grid monitors will supplement the extensive ranks of China’s surveillance workers, which on top of uniformed police and party workers also include as many as 15 million ordinary people recruited as local government informants, according to Professor Pei’s research.

這些新的網格員將進一步壯大中國龐大的監控人員隊伍。除了穿制服的警察和中共工作人員外，據裴敏新的研究，這支隊伍還包括被招募為地方政府線人的多達1500萬的普通民眾。

Beijing also deploys vast numbers of “security volunteers,” mostly retirees, during important political meetings or holidays. They are tasked with ensuring the streets look orderly: steering homeless people into shelters, scolding those who litter and alerting the police if they see suspected protesters.

中國政府還在重要的政治會議或節假日期間部署大量「安全志願者」，他們中的大部分是退休人員。他們的任務是確保街道看起來秩序井然：勸導無家可歸的人去收容所，斥責亂扔垃圾的人，發現抗議嫌疑者時報警。

On a recent Thursday in central Beijing, two residents stood on the sidewalk wearing red vests and name tags. They would be there for two hours in the morning and two in the afternoon, guarding their assigned grid unit of three apartment buildings, said one of them, Qi Jinyou, 76. Other duos were stationed regularly down the block.

最近的一個週四，在北京市中心，兩名身穿紅坎肩、戴著名牌的居民站在人行道上。兩人之一是76歲的齊金友（音），他說，他們每天早上和晚上在分配給他們的三棟公寓樓大小的網格街道上各站兩小時崗。街道裡的其他網格有其他的二人組定期站崗。

Mr. Qi had joined about a year ago, after neighborhood officials called residents at home to recruit. In return, he received gifts like tissues or toothpaste. But he also felt a sense of duty: “We have to protect, right? Safety first.”

大約一年前，街道官員打電話到居民家裡招募志願者時，齊先生加入進來。他收到紙巾或牙膏等禮物作為回報。但他也有一種責任感：「我們還是得保護，是不是？安全第一。」

In Zhangjiawan, the Beijing suburb held up as a model of Fengqiao’s successes, some residents praised the increase in patrols. Near a billboard depicting a smiling Mr. Xi, a meat seller named Wang Li said that neighborhood officials often inspected for fire hazards like loose electrical wires, or reminded residents to go for health checkups.

在北京郊區被奉為「楓橋經驗」典範的張家灣，一些居民對巡邏人員的增加表示讚賞。在一個繪有面帶微笑的習近平的大幅廣告牌附近，名叫王麗（音）的肉販說，街道官員們經常檢查火災隱患（比如是否有電線鬆動），或提醒居民做體檢。

Seeing police cars on patrol when she got off work late, she said, “I feel more at ease.”

當她下班太晚時看到巡邏的警車，「感覺挺踏實的，」她說。

Others have seen how the approach can be used to try and compel obedience.

有人已看到了這種做法如何被用來試圖強迫人們服從。

On the outskirts of Zhangjiawan, the government is demolishing and redeveloping several villages into a tourist attraction. By January, 98 percent of the roughly 1,700 households had agreed to relocate, thanks to village representatives who had visited homes more than 1,600 times, according to a social media post by the local government touting how the Fengqiao experience had “taken root.”

政府正在為發展旅遊景點而拆除張家灣附近幾個村莊的房屋。地方政府在社群媒體上發的一篇宣傳「楓橋經驗」如何在張家灣「落地生根」的帖子裡稱，約1700戶村民中的98%已在今年1月前簽約，同意搬遷，這要歸功於村代表對這些家庭進行了多達1600次走訪。

They “won trust with their professionalism, and intimacy with their sincerity,” the government said.

他們「以專業贏信任，以真心換貼心」，政府的帖子寫道。

A villager named Ms. Mu was one of the holdouts. Standing outside the low-slung house that her family had lived in for more than 20 years, she surveyed the fields where neighboring buildings had already been flattened.

堅持不搬遷的村民中有一名姓穆（音）的女子。她站在她家居住了20多年的低矮房屋外，看著周圍建築已被拆除後空出的土地。

Party officials and representatives of the developer had repeatedly called and visited her family, urging them to move out, but she felt the compensation was too low.

中共官員和開發商的代表們已多次給她家打電話或者上門，催促他們搬走，但她覺得補償太低。

“They don’t have a proper conversation with you. They just send people to grind you down,” said Ms. Mu, who asked that only her surname be used.

「他不跟你好好談，現在他們老是派人來磨你，」穆女士說，她要求在報導中只寫她的姓。

One night, as negotiations dragged on, men were stationed outside their home to intimidate them, she said. Their water supply was also cut off during the demolition of nearby buildings, but local officials did not seem to care about that, Ms. Mu said: “Not a single village official has come to ask, how can we help with this water problem?”

一天晚上，隨著談判的進行，家門外來了一些對他們進行恐嚇的男子，她說。附近的建築被拆除時，他們的供水也被切斷了，但當地官員似乎並不關心這個，穆女士說：「沒一個村幹部來（問），你們家這水問題怎麼解決？」

She and her siblings now drive into town to fill bottles with tap water.

她和她的兄弟姐妹現在要開車進城，用瓶子裝自來水運回家。

The risks of empowering low-level officials to fulfill sweeping political mandates became especially clear during the pandemic. Under pressure to prevent infections, neighborhood workers at times prevented residents from buying groceries or seeking medical care.

疫情期間，為完成範圍廣泛的政治任務，把權力賦予低層官員的風險已變得尤為明顯。在防止感染的壓力下，街道工作人員有時會阻止居民出門買菜或就醫。

Even high-profile political activists, for whom surveillance has long been routine, have felt the controls intensify. Wang Quanzhang, a human rights lawyer who was released from more than four years in prison in 2020, said that 30 or 40 people were watching his home in Beijing at any given time. He shared photographs of groups of men in black clothing sitting inside his building and following him on the street.

就連那些長期受監控的知名政治活動人士也感到了控制的加強。維權律師王全璋服滿四年刑期後於2020年獲釋，他說，每時每刻都有30到40人監視著他在北京的家。他分享了幾張照片，照片中可看到一群身穿黑衣的男子坐在他住的樓裡，他出門時在街上跟著他。

Several landlords had forced him to move out, under official pressure, he said. The authorities had also pressured schools not to let his 11-year-old son enroll, he added.

他說，幾名房東已在官方壓力下強迫他搬走。當局還向學校施壓，不允許他11歲的兒子入學，他補充說。

“We didn’t think that when they couldn’t chase us away from Beijing, they would start targeting our child,” he said. “After the epidemic, it’s gotten worse.”

「我們沒有想到他們無法把我們從北京趕走，開始對我們孩子下手，」他說。「疫情後變本加厲了。」

The success of this labor-intensive approach hinges upon the zeal of its enforcers. That has often worked to the advantage of the party, which uses financial incentives, appeals to patriotism and sometimes threats, such as to their jobs, to mobilize officials and ordinary people alike.

這種勞動密集型做法的成功取決於執行者的熱情。這曾往往對中共有利，中共使用經濟激勵、呼籲愛國精神，有時甚至是威脅（比如讓他們失去工作）等手法，來動員官員和普通民眾。

But the reliance on an army of paid workers could also be the surveillance apparatus’s central weakness, as the slowing economy forces local governments to tighten budgets.

但隨著經濟放緩迫使地方政府收緊預算，依賴一支需要發工資的大軍也可能是這個監控系統的主要弱點。

Already, some community workers and police officers have complained on social media of being overworked.

已經有一些街道工作人員和警察在社群媒體上抱怨工作量太大。

Even propaganda about Fengqiao has acknowledged the toll of making officials responsible for ever-smaller issues. One state media article lauded a police officer who, to resolve a dispute between neighbors, helped unclog a blocked pipe. “Suddenly, a large amount of sewage and feces sprayed onto his head and body,” the article said. The residents, the article continued, “felt both pity and gratitude.”

就連宣傳「楓橋經驗」的文章也承認，管的事情越來越小給警察造成了負擔。官媒在一篇表揚一名民警的文章中寫道，這名民警為了解決鄰居之間的糾紛，幫助疏通了堵塞的污水管道。「瞬間污水管道內存著的大量污水和著糞便噴灑在他的頭上身上，」文章寫道。「圍觀的群眾既心疼又感動」。

The party’s tightening grip could also stifle the dynamism that it needs to revive the economy. A fried chicken vendor in Zhangjiawan, who gave only her surname, Ma, said she had not made enough money to pay her rent for three months, in part because constantly patrolling officers prohibited her from setting up her cart on the sidewalk.

中共收緊控制也會扼殺振興經濟所需的活力。張家灣一名只說自己姓馬的炸雞小販說，她賺的錢不夠支付房租已有三個月了，部分原因是不斷來巡邏的警察禁止她把推車停放在人行道上。

“If the economy suffers, then there will be security problems,” she said. “People need to eat. If they get anxious, things will get messy.”

「整體經濟疲軟，我跟你說，社會治安就很亂，」她說。「他得吃，對，急了什麼都不幹，治安就該亂。」