Skip to main contentSkip to navigationSkip to navigation
Syria protest
Demonstrators gather during a protest against Syria's President Bashar al-Assad in Homs. Photograph: Handout/Reuters
Demonstrators gather during a protest against Syria's President Bashar al-Assad in Homs. Photograph: Handout/Reuters

Syria's internet blackout may signal something worse

This article is more than 11 years old
The Syrian government's brutal attack on the city of Hama in 1982 was also preceded by an information blackout

When, on Thursday, it was reported that Syrian telecommunications networks had been entirely disconnected, there was much speculation as to what that would mean for the opposition. Though there have been sporadic network outages over the course of the past 21 months, this was the first total blackout the country has seen.

Unlike Tunisia, which heavily monitored its networks and Egypt, which shut theirs down for a week to the tune of around $90m (£56m), Syria has taken a different approach to "cyberwarfare", deploying malware attacks against activists and offering support – at least rhetorically – to the "Syrian electronic army", a cabal of hackers that have attacked the sites of groups and individuals supportive of the opposition. Syrian authorities have also detained numerous bloggers and activists, some of whom were tracked down using technological means.

In light of that, the decision to shut down the internet has been puzzling to many observers, causing some to even speculate that the Syrian state narrative – that "terrorists" or rebels attacked network cables – might be true. In a blogpost from technology security firm Cloudflare, however, staffers explain that such a scenario is highly unlikely: "The systematic way in which routes were withdrawn suggests that this was done through updates in router configurations, not through a physical failure or cable cut."

Unlike in Egypt, where the government had to force or coerce internet service providers (ISPs) into shutting down, the Syrian government only allows ISPs to operate within the network infrastructure of STE, the Syrian telecommunications establishment. What this means is that private ISPs cannot have their own international links, allowing STE – which is state-owned – to effectively control all traffic. A network shutdown is as easy as one switch.

The shutdown is more evocative of Burma's 2007 blackout – where shutting down networks was in an apparent attempt to prevent information from reaching beyond the country's borders – than of Egypt's, during which foreign media continued to report from inside Tahrir Square.

The likelihood of Syrians gaining access to the internet is not good: one would need to have access to a satellite phone, or be close to a border and have access to a 3G phone from a neighbouring country. Dlshad Othman, a Syrian activist and IT specialist, estimates that the number of people online in Syria at the moment is probably "less than 1,000".

While US department of state spokesperson Victoria Nuland expressed confidence that tools supplied by the US would keep Syrians online, some are sceptical. Furthermore, Nuland's claim that the unnamed tools were designed to keep Syrians "secure from regime tampering" may be unfounded; while one can only speculate on what has been supplied to activists, experts say that Nuland is probably referring to satellite phone equipment, which is not proved to be safe.

Without connections into the country, and with minimal media on the ground, the prospects are terrifying. As one commentator pointed out on Twitter, the Syrian government's brutal attack on the city of Hama in 1982 was also preceded by an information blackout. Alongside reports that rebels are gaining ground in Damascus, the shutdown seems to indicate a new phase in the conflict. But with the minister of information placing blame on "terrorists" and claiming that state engineers are working to restore networks, it also seems too soon to say.

Most viewed

Most viewed